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This thesis answers a simple question:  Is there strategic utility in targeting high-
value individuals via covert or clandestine actions?  This thesis submits that there 
is strategic utility to high-value individual targeting (HVI or HVT) operations and 
offers a guide for national policy makers regarding when and how such 
operations should be conducted.  
Covert and clandestine actions must be conducted as part of a strategy 
and in support of clearly defined national goals. Foremost among the strategic 
considerations of covert action is the need to establish a desired endstate 
characterized by specific goals upon which a strategy can be built. Second, the 
strategy and subsequent methods must be consistent with the nation’s values. 
Last, any strategy must be continually evaluated for its effectiveness and revised 
when needed. 
This thesis analyzes several operations conducted by Israel between 1960 
and 1973. Israel provides United States policy makers with relevant examples 
due to similar democratic structures and security issues. The selected 
operations, particularly those directed against Palestinian terrorists, have 
parallels to the United States’ efforts against al Qaeda. The analysis of Israeli 
operations provides insight for the considerations and intellectual framework 
policy makers should understand before committing national resources to high-
risk lethal operations. 
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This thesis is intended to address a simple question:  Is there a strategic 
utility targeting high-value individuals via covert or clandestine actions?1  This 
thesis submits that there is a strategic utility to high-value individual targeting 
(HVI or HVT) operations and offers a guide to national policy makers and senior 
military leaders regarding when and how such operations should be conducted. 
The historic example of similar operations conducted by the United States’ close 
allies can provide valuable insight for the considerations and intellectual 
framework policy makers should understand before committing national 
resources to high-risk lethal operations. This thesis will analyze several 
operations conducted by Israel between 1960 and 1973. Due to both similar 
democratic structures and security concerns, Israeli lessons from covert action 
may provide valuable insight to U.S. policy makers.  The Israeli operations 
selected, particularly those directed against Palestinian terrorists, have parallels 
to the United States’ efforts against Al Qaeda.  
Covert and clandestine actions must be conducted as part of a strategy 
and in support of clearly defined national goals. Foremost amongst the strategic 
considerations of covert action is the need to clearly establish a desired endstate, 
characterized by specific goals, upon which planners can build a strategy. Covert 
and clandestine actions conducted in isolation are tactical actions without higher 
strategic purpose and only serve to expose U.S. persons to mortal risk and 
                                            
1 William Safire, “Covert Operation or Clandestine?” New York Times, 14 February, 2005. 
Safire provides a brief distinction between Covert and Clandestine: 
 Covert: Defined by USC Title 50, Section 413b as “to influence political, economic or 
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States government will 
not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” 
 Clandestine:  “A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation,” goes the definition 
in the Defense Department’s current Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, “in that 
emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of 
the sponsor.” 
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national leaders to political risk that may be detrimental to the nation as a whole. 
The nation’s covert and clandestine capabilities, resident in the military and 
intelligence services, are a means to accomplish tactical objectives. Application 
of those capabilities brings inherent risks and should only be done as part of a 
comprehensive strategy.  
There are many reasons why leaders should consider applying covert 
capabilities. In the realm of counterterrorism, clandestine effort can enable 
access to imminent threats operating from sanctuaries in remote or politically 
sensitive areas of the world. Covert and clandestine actions allow the actor to 
minimize the chance of expanding or creating a conflict with another nation  
by reducing the signature and impacts of any tactical missions, while at the same 
time allowing the actor to achieve a particular objective. The discretion and 
precision that can be achieved through covert and clandestine means  
is heightened by modern technology and the demonstrated skill and  
experience of America’s special operations forces and intelligence professionals. 
That discretion makes covert tools an attractive choice for national decision 
makers who desire decisive effects in politically sensitive or non-permissive 
environments.  
This thesis offers a framework to ensure that covert tools are tied to a 
strategy that is consistent with national goals and, most importantly, national 
values established in the Constitution and restated in modern language in  
the 2010 National Security Strategy and 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism.2 The suggested framework to ensure proper use of covert 
                                            
2 A description of the national values is found in the most recent versions of both the National 
Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism:   
White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 35. 
White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), 
5. 
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means is called the Strategic Cycle.3  Figure 1 depicts the Strategic Cycle 
consisting of three phases:  Visualize, Design, and Evaluate. 
 
Figure 1.  Strategic Cycle 
The Visualize phase starts with defining the problem that must be 
addressed. Then leaders must envision an environment where the problem is 
either eliminated or reduced to a manageable level; this is called the endstate. 
From the endstate, specific goals should be established that, if achieved, will 
enable the endstate conditions. During the Design phase, leaders and planners 
develop a strategy to achieve the endstate goals. Ideally, this strategy 
considers using all of the instruments of national power:  diplomatic, military, 
information and economic.4  Strategy leads to specific plans which achieve 
milestone objectives in support of one or more national goals. Plans are 
                                            
3 Strategic Cycle is a term designed for this thesis and not derived from any other source. 
See Figure 1. 
4 Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–0: Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: 
Pentagon, 11 August 2011), I-4, Para 3.b. 
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conducted by individual agencies or, more frequently, by joint-interagency 
teams. The execution of specific plans at the tactical and operational levels falls 
under the Evaluate phase of the cycle. During this phase, relevant information 
should be collected during and after each mission, regardless of tactical 
success or failure, to determine if the desired strategic effects are being 
achieved. In order to make accurate assessments, planners at all levels must 
establish measure of effectiveness. If tactical plans are successful, but strategic 
goals are not being met, then the plans or the entire strategy may need to be 
revised. As more information is collected about the environment, the endstate 
and the goals may also need to be amended. Figure 4 at the end of this thesis 
offers a detailed flow chart that if followed, can guide planners through a 
strategic cycle. The key to success for any operation, be it overt or covert, is to 
ensure that it is tied to a comprehensive strategy. The conceptual tools offered 
in this thesis could apply to any national security crisis. Situations that may 
require lethal force, however, often are accompanied by high levels of political 
risk. For this reason, a strategic framework is particularly relevant when 
considering covert or clandestine actions. Man-hunting, now commonly referred 
to in military jargon as high value individual targeting (HVI or HVT), has always 
been controversial as a strategy for defeating a threat.  
The controversy regarding HVT operations falls into two categories: 1) 
effects and 2) politics. While HVT operations conducted inside internationally 
recognized theaters of war and in compliance with the Geneva conventions 
need only be evaluated based on their effects, HVT operations outside of 
theaters of war are inherently more complex as they require consideration of 
international political relationships and domestic legal, social and political 
concerns. The post 9/11 war on terror has forced U.S. leaders and policy 
makers to consider the costs and benefits of HVT operations as part of a 
broader counterterrorism strategy. The U.S. National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism, revised in June 2011, establishes a basic legal justification 
by clearly naming al-Qaida the enemy in a war on terror and acknowledges that 
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early post 9/11 CT efforts were conducted in an “environment of legal 
uncertainty.”5  Additionally, the targeted killing and capture of key al-Qaida 
individuals, especially Usama bin Laden, is credited as a key element of the 
successful application of the national CT strategy.6  Accepting that HVT 
operations are now a key element of the U.S. CT strategy, it is imperative that 
national decision makers employ HVT operations in a manner that is both 
consistent with U.S. core values and achieves optimal strategic effects. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Israel, a historically and ideologically close ally with the U.S., has been 
employing HVT strategies to counter threats since before its independence 
from Britain in 1948. In 1936, Ezra Danin, a founding member of the Zionist 
Shai (the precursor to Mossad intelligence agency) stated:   
We are not confronting the Arabs, but a very specific Arab. We 
need to know who he is. Some lad sits up on a hill or down in a 
valley and fires – and we all scream and panic and leap into the 
trenches when all we’re really talking about is Ali or Muhammad. 
We have to be able to identify him and act against him.7 
Danin’s philosophy on countering terrorism would become the cornerstone of 
Israeli counterterror strategy after 1948. Israel also readily applied its man-
hunting skills to locate and capture Nazi war criminals years after the end of 
WWII; most notably capturing Adolf Eichmann, the infamous architect of the final 
solution to kill the Jews, in Buenos Aires in 1960. In order to capture Adolf 
Eichmann, Mossad agents used various covers to infiltrate Argentina, conduct 
surveillance and eventually capture Eichmann in order to bring him to trial for the 
genocide of over 5 million Jews. In 1972, in response to the massacre of 11 
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, Israel conducted one of the boldest 
covert action campaigns in history, killing several of the Palestinian terrorists in 
                                            
5 White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 6. 
6 White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Introduction.  
7 Ian Black and Benny Morris,  Israel’s Secret Wars:  A History of Israel’s Intelligence 
Services (New York:  Grove Press, 1991), 7. 
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Europe. The targeted Palestinians were deemed responsible for the Munich 
massacre and were killed in a series of dramatic and often very public 
assassinations.  
The U.S. can learn valuable lessons from analyzing the Israeli HVT 
operations and their overall impact on achieving national objectives. This thesis 
will analyze selected Israeli man-hunts conducted as clandestine or covert 
actions from the viewpoint of key national decision makers, following the 
operations through the execution and effects and in the context of the 
international and domestic environments. 
1. Operation Eichmann 
The Israeli mission to capture infamous Nazi War criminal Adolf Eichmann 
in May 1960 is an example of a clandestine action in a non-permissive political 
environment in pro-fascist Argentina. Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion assessed 
that a request for Argentina to arrest and then extradite Eichmann to Israel had a 
high-potential of resulting in Eichmann being warned by Nazi sympathizers in the 
Argentine government. Eichmann was largely responsible for the death of over 5 
million Jews during the Holocaust and his capture and trial represented a 
national goal of paramount value. The value of justice for Eichmann’s crimes 
parallels the value of American justice against Usama Bin Laden for the terror 
attacks of September 2001. Although Israeli-Argentine political relations were 
threatened as a result of the Eichmann capture, the mission represented a moral 
imperative to Israeli leaders. The domestic support for the operation well 
outweighed the international political risks. In the Eichmann scenario, the 
endstate desired was one were the emotional wounds of the Holocaust that 
affected an entire nation could heal through achieving the goal of a public justice. 
The strategy, although it failed to adequately address effective mitigation of the 
post-operations international political crisis, was well conceived with regard to the 
tactical mission and domestic politics.  
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2. Wrath of God 
In contrast to the tactical and strategic success of the Eichmann operation, 
the Israeli response to September 1972 massacre of 11 Israeli Olympic team 
members in Munich was far less successful. Operation Wrath of God was hastily 
conceived by Israel to target the Black September Organization (BSO), a 
Palestinian terror group under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO). Wrath of God was conceived largely in response to the 
emotional rage that consumed Israeli social and political life after the Munich 
massacre, which the BSO had carried out. The endstate envisioned by Prime 
Minister Golda Meir was one where Israeli citizens were safe from terror attacks. 
The goals she prescribed seemed to require more than just a military strategy: 1) 
biblically consistent justice or “an eye for an eye”  2) Deterrence of future 
Palestinian terror  3) Prevention of attacks currently in planning. No aspect of the 
Israel’s military efforts attempted to address the underlying conditions behind the 
Palestinian violence against Israel. The strategy Israel adopted to address 
Palestinian violence was not born from a comprehensive whole-of-government 
approach, but was really just a continuation of Israeli’s default “eye for an eye” 
habitual response adopted during the Arab-Jewish conflict that began during the 
days of the British mandate over Palestine. PM Meir and her top advisors simply 
prescribed a tactical plan of targeted killings of a selected list of PLO members 
operating in Europe.  
The tactic of assassination was, for the most part, successful in killing the 
individuals on the list with minimal collateral damage, until an entire Israeli team 
killed the wrong target in Lillehammer, Norway in July 1973. The team exercised 
poor tradecraft and was quickly arrested by local police, resulting in full exposure 
of Israeli sponsorship for the mission. Up until Lillehammer, the missions were 
tactically successful, yet all indications are that the mission compelled the PLO to 
increase its efforts to conduct spectacular violence against Israeli targets on a 
global stage. Israel seemed to ignore this fact and continued to hunt Palestinians 
across Europe. The tactic became the strategy by default and the stated strategic 
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goals were not accomplished. The dissociation of strategy and tactical plans 
often plagues military planners. The U.S. drone program directed against 
militants in Pakistan may fall into the category of a successful tactic without any 
strategy. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature for this thesis can be organized into two groups:  1)  
Historical accounts and commentary on the HVT operations  2)  Theory and 
opinions regarding politics, counterterrorism, ehtics and international law. The 
historical accounts are primarily books written by persons involved in the actions 
or by scholars who compiled various primary and some secondary sources. In 
general, the historic accounts in English tend to rely heavily on Israeli sources, 
although some books such as One Day in September do include a good deal of 
comments from PLO members and Arab diplomats.8  The preponderance of 
Israeli centric English language texts, although naturally biasing, does actually 
support the research method of analyzing the operations by comparing Israeli 
stated goals, observing decision and supporting motivations, and then evaluating 
how well the effects of the operations met the goals. A few selected texts offer 
greater perspective and detail on Palestinian viewpoints with regard to the PLO 
actions during the 1960s and 1970s. The most detailed text  with a Palestinian 
perspective is Yezid Sayigh’s Armed Struggle and the Search for State.9  Sayigh 
avoids associating any PLO actions with terrorism, but does provide quotes from 
Palestinian leaders about the militant struggle against Israel. With regard to the 
second grouping of literature, the theory and especially legal opinions are 
generally much more critical of Israeli approaches and provide more balanced, 
albeit still primarily western, viewpoints on the strategies that Israel and the U.S. 
have adopted with regard to man-hunts or HVT operations.  
                                            
8 Simon Reeve, One Day in September:  The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics 
Massacre and The Israeli Revenge Operation Wrath of God  (New York:  Arcade Publishing, 
2011). 
9 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National 
Movement, 1949–1993 (London: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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The historical accounts can be broken into two categories:  1) general 
historical accounts of Israeli actions during the 20th century. 2)  specific accounts 
of the selected case studies. There are few sanctioned or officially declassified 
Israeli government documents related to any activities conducted by Israel’s 
intelligence or security agencies. Of note, Ian Black and Benny Morris, state in 
their introduction to Israel’s Secret Wars that the study of Israeli covert and 
clandestine operations is extremely difficult to Israel’s generally good operational 
security (OPSEC) and conservative viewpoint toward releasing documents and 
information to the media or public. 10  The cases selected for this thesis are a few 
of the more well documented operations, likely due to the international media and 
public attention generated by operations. Israel’s Secret Wars is probably the 
most comprehensive book written on Israel’s security apparatus, partially due to 
the fact that it was one of the few books written with some amount of approval or 
cooperation of Israeli officials. Israel’s Secret Wars, however, is not very detail 
oriented about any specific events, rather it portrays Israeli actions in the larger 
regional and global political context and often cites Israeli officials or documents.  
The Eichmann operation is probably the most well documented single 
case, partially due to the overwhelming international support for Israel’s actions 
and the collective international condemnation of the Nazi human rights violations 
during WWII. Adolf Eichmann’s capture in 1960 was also a sensational news 
story. Regardless of whether someone approved of Israel’s actions or not, the 
clandestine capture of Adolf Eichmann, publicly announced only after Eichmann 
was safely in Israeli custody, was immediately exploited for profit with the release 
of a U.S. independent film in 1961 title:  Operation Eichmann:  Manhunt of the 
Century.11  In 1975, Isser Harel’s book The House on Garibaldi Street was 
published. Harel was the Mossad chief responsible for the mission to capture 
Eichmann and his book was and still is the most authoritative and detailed 
                                            
10 Black and Morris,  Israel’s Secret Wars, xii. 
11 Lester Cole, Operation Eichmann. Independent Film directed by R.G. Springsteen, March 
1961. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0055261/taglines?ref_=tt_stry_tg 
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account of the mission and the key decisions and events surrounding it. Harel 
was a key Israeli national decision maker and a direct line to the prime minister 
and key cabinet members, making his account of the mission an optimal primary 
source. Other notable sources that provide a great deal of insight about the 
political context and strategic concerns of the mission are Neal Bascomb’s 
Hunting Eichmann published in 2009 and Peter Malkin’s 1990 book Eichmann in 
My Hands.12 13 Peter Malkin was a team member on the Eichmann Operation 
and claims to have been the man that first laid hands on Eichmann during the 
capture mission. Bascomb’s book is by far the most unbiased account of the 
operation, since it is one of the few English language texts that is not solely 
based on personal accounts of participants. Bascomb does spend two chapters, 
however, recounting the atrocities that Eichmann was responsible for and how 
Eichmann initially escaped Germany at WWII’s conclusion. The 1988 book The 
Nazi Hunters provides a good general overview of the total allied efforts 
immediately upon WWII’s conclusion to round-up Nazi officials and also provides 
a good overview, in the broader international context,  of the high profile 
manhunts conducted years later;  chapters 1 and 5 cover Operation Eichmann. 
There are several books written Operation Wrath of God, most of which 
are a compilation of interviews from participants as well as excerpts from journals 
and media reporting in Europe immediately following the separate missions. All 
of the sources used in the thesis discuss Operation Wrath of God and Operation 
Spring of Youth together since the latter was considered to be part of the larger 
Wrath of God line of operations. Spring of Youth, however, is identified in Israel’s 
Secret Wars as the only mission that was planned and conducted by the elite 
Sayaret counterterror unit of the IDF, with considerable intelligence and logistics 
support from the various Israeli intelligence agencies.14  Ian Black and Benny 
                                            
12 Neal Bascomb, Hunting Eichmann:  How a Band of Survivors and a Young Spy Agency 
Chased Down the World’s Most Notorious Nazi (New York:  Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009). 
13 Malkin, Peter and Harry Stein, Eichmann in My Hands (New York:  Warner Books, 1990). 
14 Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 274–275. 
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Morris offer only a broad overview of the participants, goals and effects regarding 
the Wrath of God serious, while Simon Reeve’s One Day in September gives a 
detailed account of the Munich massacre and each of the Wrath of God 
missions.15 Relying heavily on interviews and media accounts, Reeve’s 
chronology is factually accurate when compared to other sources, but also 
makes some assumptions about the specific task organization and operational 
details of some of the missions.  
The first chapter of Samual Katz’s Guards Without Borders provides an 
excellent primary and secondary source account of the strategic context of Wrath 
of God and Spring of Youth.16  Katz addresses Spring of Youth as a separate 
operation and provides considerable details about the operational planning and 
decisions involved. In Striking Back, written by an IDF intelligence officer, each 
Wrath of God mission is described in some detail with both Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders cited, however, the overall tone is clearly pro-Israeli.17  The 
most notable book about the Wrath of God operation is George Jonas’s 
Vengeance.18  Jonas’s book is based primarily on a series of interviews with one 
of the Wrath of God team leaders and besides being the inspiration for Steven 
Spielberg’s famed 2005 movie “Munich,” Vengeance provides a unique insider’s 
perspective regarding the decisions and results of the Wrath of God missions. 
One additional source, a 1995 Marine Corps Command and Staff thesis written 
by Alaxander Calahan, provides a corroborating account of the Wrath of God 
                                            
15 Simon Reeve, One Day in September, . 
16 Samuel Katz, Guards Without Borders: Israel’s War Against Terrorism (London:  Arms 
and Armour, 1990). 
17 Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly 
Response (New York: Random House, 2005). 
18 George Jonas, Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Counterterrorist Team (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2005).  
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missions with additional analysis that strongly praises the boldness and overall 
effectiveness of the operation.19 
In the second grouping, political theory and legal opinions, there are a few 
cornerstone items. James Fearon’s theory of Audience Costs and its escalation 
effects on conflict is particularly relevant in the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.20  Lisa Hajjar’s legal opinion paper comparing Israeli and U.S. 
counterterror doctrine in the context of international humanitarian and military 
laws offers unique critique of the legal foundation espoused by U.S. leaders in 
the U.S. National Strategy for CT published in 2011.21  David Rudgers also 
offers some historical basis for the utility of covert actions as a counterpoint to 
the modern controversy.22  There are several point papers from political science 
and legal journals that criticize the use and effectiveness of covert actions with 
varying degrees of objectivity. Notably, Paul Wilkinson’s article on International 
responses to terrorism discusses the efficacy of several strategies  
 
                                            
19 Alexander B. Calahan, “Countering Terrorism:  The Israeli Response to the 1973 Munich 
Olympic massacre and the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams”  (master’s thesis, 
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1995). 
20 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International 
Disputes,”  American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 577–592. 
21 Lisa, Hajjar. “International Humanitarian Law and Wars on Terror:  A Comparative 
Analysis of Israeli and American Doctrines and Policies.” Journal of Palestine Studies, 36, no.1 
(Autumn 2006): 21–42. 
22 David Rudgers, “The Origins of Covert Action.” Journal of Contemporary History, 35 
(2000): 249–262. 
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II. OPERATION EICHMANN 
A. DISCUSSION  
In some cases, such as the missions to capture Adolf Eichmann or kill 
Usama Bin Laden, the intrinsic value of the mission to the domestic audience 
made the decision much easier. In both cases, the targeted individual 
represented an icon of evil, despised by the majority of the domestic population. 
In such cases, action, either covert or overt becomes a moral imperative for the 
nation and often a matter of political survival for national decision makers. Had 
President Obama not authorized a strike on Usama bin Laden (UBL), given the 
credible intelligence of UBL’s location, the eventual public leak of that fact would 
likely have been the President’s political downfall and potentially cost him the re-
election. Similarly with Adolf Eichmann, simply suppressing the reports of 
Eichmann’s presence in Argentina was a significant political risk, especially after 
Fritz Bauer finally acquired a second corroborating source that identified Ricardo 
Klement as Eichmann’s alias in Argentina.23 
In the case of Adolf Eichmann, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion saw the 
eventual public trial of the man responsible for the death of over 5 million Jews 
as essential to Israel’s identity as a nation born from the holocaust. Both Ben-
Gurion and his intelligence chief, Isser Harel, knew full well that capturing 
Eichmann in Argentina was uncharted territory for the new nation of Israel, and 
could severely strain Israel’s growing political and economic relationship with 
Argentina. The domestic concerns and the moral imperative to bring Eichmann to 
justice made the risk acceptable in the eyes of the prime minister. The fact that a 
covert action was chosen over a formal request for extradition required thorough 
consideration of post-operation responses and crisis mitigation if the mission 
were compromised or Israeli attempts to ensure plausible deniability failed to 
satisfy the Argentinians. Ben-Gurion and Harel failed to fully consider the social 
                                            
23 Hanna Yoblonka and Ora Cummings, State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann (Westminster, 
MD: Knopf Publishing, 2004), 16. 
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and political dynamics in Argentina that would compel the Argentine president to 
take a political hardline response vis-à-vis Israel in response to the Eichmann 
incident. 
James Fearon’s concept of audience costs should be considered in cases 
where covert action is a possible tool for achieving a national goal, especially 
when postulating the political blowback of an exposed operation. According to 
Fearon, the decisions of any leader with respect to an international conflict are 
largely driven by the leaders own fear of looking inept or weak to his own 
constituency. The need to appear strong to a domestic audience in the face of 
potential international conflict applies more so in a democracy, where leaders are 
elected by popular vote.24  The use of a covert or clandestine action to achieve a 
national goal intends to avoid attribution to the actor and therefore reduce the 
possibility audience costs escalating a conflict internationally. The post-operation 
responses to both the international and domestic audience should consider the 
worst case outcome, such as the Eichmann operation, where the misattribution 
of the act to “private citizens” was immediately discredited both in Israel and 
Argentina. The required audience costs calculations therefore must consider the 
domestic costs for both the actor and the recipient, in this case Argentina.  
On the domestic front, the clandestine actions may be intended to become 
public information post-facto in order to garner domestic support such as in the 
Bin Laden raid or the Eichmann capture. The Eichmann mission was clandestine 
during the operation and the results announced only after the mission success 
was determined. The Bin Laden raid was conducted by U.S. SOF, but under U.S. 
Code Title 50 authorities for covert action and therefore at least nominally under 
the supervision of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.  In each case, 
the administration deemed that mission success would result in favorable public 
support whereas a failed mission would not be viewed favorably. Thus the 
clandestine efforts may still have afforded each actor a measure of deniability. 
                                            
24 Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,”  577–
578. 
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Operation Eichmann was clandestine with respect to the conduct of the mission, 
but also covert with respect to the initial post-facto responses to inquiries about 
how Eichmann came into Israeli custody.25   
The administration may desire for the action to never be revealed or 
properly attributed to the government, but must still consider the consequences if 
it is inadvertently exposed during or immediately after the mission. The notion 
that an administration may base its decision to act on the surmised public 
support for such actions, has been a consistent theme throughout recent history, 
especially in democracies. Fearon states: 
Publicly observable measures of relative military capabilities and 
relative interests prove to have no direct effect once a crisis begins. 
Instead, relative audience costs matter: the side with a stronger 
domestic audience (e.g., a democracy) is always less likely to back 
down than the side less able to generate audience costs (a non-
democracy). More broadly, the analysis suggests that democracies 
should be able to signal their intentions to other states more 
credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can.26 
While the Israeli Prime Minister was certain that he would have 
overwhelming ex-post facto public support for the operation to capture Eichmann 
based solely on the moral imperative, the same could not be said for Argentine 
public support for the Israeli action. Argentina under the Peron’ administration 
until 1953 had been an autocratic fascist regime and staunchly pro-German.27   
Even under Peron’s more moderate successor, President Frondizi, the nationalist 
influence in Argentine society and government remained strong, creating a great 
deal of internal tension and audience costs for the moderate Argentine President. 
                                            
25 An operation can be both clandestine and covert in nature. U.S. Federal Law categorizes 
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attempts to misattribute the perpetrators for the mission made it also covert. For a detailed 
explanation of U.S. Legal definitions see:  http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/413b 
26 Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” 577. 
27 Ranaan Rein, Argentina, Israel, and the Jews: Peron, the Eichmann Capture and After 
(Bethesda, MD: University of Maryland Press, 2002), 167–169. 
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B. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
On May 23rd, 1960 the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, 
announced to the Israeli parliament that Adolf Eichmann, the German Gestapo 
Colonel in charge of the SS Jewish Section, was in custody in Israel and would 
stand trial for war crimes. This simple announcement, later called a “dramatic 
understatement” by the New York Times, immediately tore through the 
international media and grasped the attention of the world.28  Adolf Eichmann 
was largely responsible for the implementation and brutal efficiency of Hitler’s 
‘Final Solution’ to the Jewish question. Witnesses at the Nuremburg trials 
claimed that Eichmann bragged about his role in exterminating the Jews, stating 
“I will leap into my grave laughing, because the feeling I have five million human 
beings on my conscience is for me a source of extraordinary satisfaction.”29  The 
bold and viciously committed Eichmann had even sent 27,000 Jews on a 125 
mile forced march through snow covered mountain roads from Hungary to camps 
in Austria in late 1944. At the time, the Russians were quickly advancing through 
Hungary and the railways were either shut down or destroyed. The forced march 
was too much for most of the already emaciated and sickly Jewish prisoners and 
most did not survive. SS officers, acting on Eichmann’s orders, killed all those 
that could not keep up or fell ill, including woman and children. Eichmann ordered 
this march, even after Reichsfuehrer Himmler ordered him to stop exterminating 
Jews in December 1944. Himmler knew the war would not end well for Germany 
and believed the remaining interned Jews could be used as a bargaining piece 
during negotiations with the Allies.30  Eichmann, however, was committed to the 
efficient and total extermination of the Jews. There was no question in the 
                                            
28 Charles Ashman and Robert J. Wagman, The Nazi Hunters (New York: Pharos Books, 
1988), 128–129. 
29 Ashman and Wagman, The Nazi Hunters, 129. 
30 Bascomb,  Hunting Eichmann, 9–12. 
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Knesset (Israeli Parliament) about whether Eichmann should be tried; the only 
question was how he came into Israeli custody a full 15 years after the war.31   
Prime minister Ben-Gurion, unlike President Obama in his speech to 
America after the UBL mission, offered no details regarding exactly how 
Eichmann came into Israeli custody. After Ben-Gurion’s initial announcement, 
Israeli officials released an official explanation regarding the Eichmann capture; 
attributing the mission to independent Israeli patriots who tracked down and 
confronted Eichmann. The story may have been believable to some, except that 
it also claimed Eichmann voluntarily traveled with the Israeli Nazi hunters back to 
Israel in order to stand trial.32  The secrets regarding Eichmann’s apprehension, 
however, would not last long considering the tremendous international interest 
and intrigue regarding the capture of one of the “big three” Nazi war criminals.33  
By June of 1960, Israeli officials had privately admitted to their Argentine 
counterpart’s responsibility for Eichmann’s capture and asked if “the Argentine 
government will show understanding in the face of such historic and moral 
values.”34  Argentina chose to respond publicly to Israeli overtures for 
understanding by lodging a formal complaint with the United Nations on June 
15th, 1960.  
Isser Harel, chief of Israel’s newly formed Mossad, was focused on Arab 
threats and gave little credence to another rumor about a living Nazi war criminal; 
however, Harel noted that Walter Eytan was usually a restrained and calm man, 
but the news of a potentially credible sighting of Eichmann, which included a 
physical address, had Eytan quite excited. Harel noted after listening to Eytan, 
                                            
31 For a more detailed synopsis of Israeli efforts to locate Adolf Eichmann with a timeline of 
key events associated with the capture mission, see Thesis APPENDIX A. 
32 Ashman and Wagman, The Nazi Hunters, 131–132. 
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“…I suspected something quite out of the ordinary was in the wind.”35  Fritz 
Bauer had also spoken with Attorney General Haim Cohen during his 1958 visit 
to Israel to meet with Walter Eytan and expressed his confidence in the veracity 
of his source’s information. Harel, although still skeptical, was compelled to 
investigate the report further and knew that the first step was to speak with the 
source and confirm Eichmann’s identity.  
Harel demanded access to Bauer’s source in Argentina and sent 
experienced agents with Spanish language skills to Argentina to confirm 
Eichmann’s identify in January 1958. After following several leads and almost 
two years of careful clandestine investigations, agents attained two pictures of 
the man suspected to be Eichmann by using concealed cameras and posing as 
real estate investors searching for properties..  
By December 1959, Harel obtained expert analysis of the grainy 
photographs and believed that Eichmann was indeed living in a Buenos Aires 
suburb.36    Believing that extradition would result in Eichmann being warned by 
sympathetic local authorities, and knowing full well the moral and historic value of 
seeking justice against a man responsible for the near extinction of the Jewish 
people, David Ben-Gurion gave Harel the approval to capture Eichmann.37  
There was no cabinet meeting or internal debate, other than the simple 
discussion between the Prime Minister and his intelligence chief.  
Harel did not have to convince Ben-Gurion that capturing Eichmann was 
the preferred course of action; recent history had already done that for him when 
West-Germany’s request for Dr. Mengele’s extradition in 1959 to the Argentinian 
government resulted in Mengele fleeing to Paraguay before he could be arrested. 
Mengele had actually applied for new German citizenship documents under his 
true name in 1956 through the German embassy in Buenos Aires. It took almost 
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three years for Hermann Langbein, a former medical clerk who had worked 
under Mengele and witnessed his horrific experiments on Jews in Auschwitz, to 
lead the legal effort to indict Mengele for murder in Germany. The German 
government had shown little interest in pursuing former Nazi’s and it was 
rumored that someone in German State Prosecutor’s office in Bonn tipped off the 
Mengele family about Langbein’s efforts to seek an indictment. It is also 
noteworthy that Mengele was arrested in Buenos Aires for practicing medicine 
without a license three weeks prior to his indictment in Germany.38  Regardless 
of Mengele’s true reason for fleeing Argentina, the end result shaped Harel’s 
recommendation and Ben-Gurion’s decision to capture him versus seeking an 
extradition. Ironically, the Israeli and Argentine governments were working on an 
extradition agreement when Eichmann was captured, with both sides having 
signed the document only a few days before Ben-Gurion announced that 
Eichmann was in Israeli custody. 
Harel was conflicted about the mission and took it with a sense of solemn 
obligation and gravity. Harel’s moral conflict was not feigned. In 1974, Harel 
summarized the full measure of his internal conflict regarding the decision:   
Operation Eichmann had to be performed. The fact that it was 
necessary to take Eichmann out of Argentina caused us a deal of 
inner conflict. My mind was by no means easy about the need to 
carry out a clandestine action in the sovereign territory of a friendly 
country, and the question of whether it was permissible to do so—
from both the ethical and political points of view – had to be faced 
in all its gravity.39 
Although he felt conflicted, Harel clearly saw that the domestic social 
significance of trying Eichmann in a Jewish court far outweighed the international 
political risks. The deep sense of gravity with regard to the capture operation 
likely served to ensure the mission planning and supervision were careful, 
accurate and thorough. Nice point 
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Due to the fact that the mission clearly violated international law and the 
sovereignty of a friendly nation, Harel decided that he must personally lead the 
mission and be accountable for its success or failure. Additionally, the team must 
be made up of volunteers. Of course Harel had no trouble finding volunteers, 
most of who were concentration camp survivors and therefore personally 
invested in the mission. Harel also ensured that his team understood the 
seriousness of the mission both tactically and strategically. Harel told his all-
volunteer capture team, “it is sad that when we come to fulfill such a lofty national 
and moral mission, we must resort to force, and hurt a friendly state. We are not 
happy about this deed, but necessity knows no law.”40  Lastly, both Harel and 
Ben-Gurion decided to minimize the culpability of other government leaders, 
especially the Israeli Ambassador to Argentina, by not divulging the plan. This 
put the political consequences squarely on the Prime Minister’s shoulders, while 
at the same time maximizing the required operational security needed for an 
operation of this magnitude.  
Besides the real risks of the team being caught in the act, resulting in 
Eichmann escaping and a major embarrassing international incident with 
subsequent domestic political scandal ensuing from a botched covert action, 
there was also a real concern about Israel’s obligation to the 300,000 Jews living 
in Argentina.41  While Argentina certainly encouraged and even facilitated Nazi 
emigration to the country, mostly due to President Peron’s fascist political 
platform and desire to reap the benefits of German scientific and military 
intellectual property, the Argentinians also embraced other refugee populations 
like the Jews.42  Similarly, the U.S. and Great Britain shared Argentina’s desire to 
acquire German intellectual property and focus on countering the scourge of 
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communism that was spreading across the globe.43 Still, Ben-Gurion was 
legitimately concerned that the relations between the large Jewish diaspora in 
Argentina and the Argentinian government would be harmed as a consequence 
of the Eichmann operation. This fear, however, was later proven to be unfounded 
since Argentina was interested in garnering U.S. financial aid and military support 
and the Jewish population in Argentina was well connected with their politically 
influential counterparts in the U.S. 
C. THE MISSION    
By February 1960 a small Mossad team arrived in Buenos Aires to locate, 
and capture Eichmann. The personnel assigned to locate Eichmann were posing 
as real estate investors, seeking a vacant property in Eichmann’s neighborhood. 
By early April 1960 the reconnaissance of Eichmann was complete, and the team 
knew his daily routine and planned to grab him as he stepped off the evening 
bus, returning from work, and walked approximately 200 meters to his small 
house on Garibaldi Street in the San Fernando suburb of Buenos Aires. From 
there, Eichmann was to be brought to a safe house in Buenos Aires, undergo a 
thorough medical examination and interrogation to confirm his true identity, and 
wait with the team until he could be transported back to Israel on an El Al Airliner. 
Harel had brokered a deal with the operations manager of El Al, also a 
concentration camp survivor, and secured the use of one airliner. The jet would 
carry Mossad agents, posing as airline attendants and be arriving in Buenos 
Aires to deliver the Israeli delegation to the Argentina’s 150th anniversary 
celebration.  
The operation went as planned, and on the evening of May 20th, 1960, an 
El Al airliner took off from Buenos Aires with an exhausted yet elated team of 
Mossad agents and drugged and incoherent, yet very much alive, Adolf 
Eichmann. The plane landed in Tel Aviv the next morning. Two days later, Ben-
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Gurion announced to the Knesset and to the world that Eichmann was in custody 
and would be tried for his crimes against the Jewish people and humanity. 
D. POST-FACTO RESPONSES  
In his announcement to the Knesset, Ben-Gurion never said where 
Eichmann was found. Immediately following the public announcement, the Israeli 
government spread rumors through informal channels that Eichmann had been 
located in a near-by Arab country.44  This propaganda campaign intended to 
build on the well-known fact that Egypt was employing several German 
scientists, including some former Nazi’s. The attempts to mislead both the 
domestic and international public, however, did not work and by the end of May, 
Time Magazine reported that Eichmann was captured in Argentina. One Buenos 
Aires newspaper even praised the Israeli security services for their professional 
work in capturing Eichmann without incident.45  The Israeli minister, Abba Eban, 
attending the Argentinian 150th anniversary independence celebration was still in 
Argentina when the local press started reporting on the incident. Eban was 
forced to hold an impromptu press conference in Buenos Aires and honestly 
stated: “ I know nothing about it” to the local media. This answer, however, did 
little to quell the outrage of the Argentinian government. The Argentine foreign 
minister, Diogenes Tabodoa, confronted the Israeli Ambassador, Arye Levavi, 
and after receiving responses similar to those of Eban, stated:  “If Eichmann was 
captured in Argentina, that is a contrary to international norms and will compel 
Argentina, despite its good relations with Israel, to register a most serious 
protest, with unforeseeable consequences.”46  The Israeli officials in Buenos 
Aires were unable to dampen the animosity over the affair. Ambassador Levavi 
was especially concerned that the political backlash inside Argentina would 
weaken the current regime and force them to break-off all diplomatic ties with 
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Israel in order to save face domestically and mitigate their own apparent lack of 
control. Levavi advised the Israeli foreign ministry: 
In my view there is an almost certain danger that the Argentine 
government, weak and beleaguered by the opposition, will be forced to cease 
diplomatic relations with us if we do not deny the Eichmann kidnapping here. 
Such a denial will balance the situation, and slowly the good tenor of relations 
that prevailed in the past will return. A break in diplomatic relations with us will be 
a fatal blow to the local Jews and to their actions on behalf of Israel, and will 
undermine our position throughout Latin America for a long time.47 
Ambassador Levavi likely felt slighted by his exclusion from the Eichmann 
mission and, in hind sight, overstated the negative long-term consequences of 
action. Still, the immediate impact to Israeli-Argentine relations was severe. 
Argentina of course demanded that Eichmann be returned to their custody and 
the perpetrators, whom Israel claimed to be Jewish citizens acting independently, 
be punished. The blowback for local Jews was noticeable with a surge in street 
violence, some of it targeted against local Jews in Buenos Aires suspected of 
supporting the mission.48 
In order to further calm the situation, Ben-Gurion wrote a personal letter to 
Argentine President Frondizi, expressing his sincere regret for violating 
Argentina’s national sovereignty, but also stating that the issue was an “inner 
moral imperative” for Israel and an “act of supreme historic justice.”49  Frondizi, 
while personally understanding the Israeli motivations, was caught in a domestic 
fight with right wing elements in his own government , especially the foreign 
ministry and still Nazi sympathetic catholic church. The radical faction Union 
Civica Radical del Pueblo was using the situation to discredit the President, while 
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influential catholic leaders in Argentina, such as Cardinal Antonio Caggiano, 
made statements such as: 
The man had come to our country in search of forgiveness and oblivion, 
and it does not matter what his name is, Ricardo Clement or Adolf Eichmann; our 
obligation as Christians is to forgive what he has done.50 
A few weeks after the cardinal’s statements, the Argentine government 
filed a formal protest with the United Nations Security Council, and sent Mario 
Amadeo, a former foreign minister and prominent catholic. Amadeo made his 
argument to the security council, stating “Argentina was always generous in 
opening its doors to refugees from all over the world: this policy permitted Adolf 
Eichmann to enter the country fraudulently, in the same way that many Jews 
did.”51   The Argentine delegation made little headway in gaining any tangible 
action from the UN Security Council. The Council did hold a meeting about the 
violation and condemned Israel’s actions and ordered Israel to give Argentina 
“appropriate reparations.” The resolution passed with two amendments, drafted 
by the U.S., stating that the Security Council was “mindful of the universal 
condemnation of the persecution of the Jews under the Nazis and of the concern 
of people in all countries that Eichmann be brought to appropriate justice for the 
crimes of which he is accused.”52  The second amendment called for the 
“advancement” of friendly relations between Argentina and Israel.53  Essentially, 
the UN remained neutral toward the entire affair with the lack of real action 
favoring Israel’s position.  
Israel’s public response to the UN assembly, offered by Golda Meir, 
continued to claim that private Israeli citizens, acting alone and on their own 
conscience, captured Eichmann. Golda Meir apologized for the actions of those 
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citizens in violating Argentina’s sovereignty, but expressed her belief that in the 
context of the “horror of the Nazis’ extermination of six million Jews,” Eichmann’s 
kidnapping should be accepted and he be brought to justice. 
The Security Council resolution, while a public condemnation of the act, 
was essentially a victory for Israel and further infuriated right-wing elements in 
the Argentina, especially those in the foreign ministry. President Frondizi was 
compelled to act publically and declared the Israeli Ambassador in Buenos Aires 
“persona non-grata” in July 1960. This act, however, was the most Frondizi was 
willing to do and he would later state that “it was all staged” and intended to 
preserve his image at home.54  Whether staged or not, the decree to oust the 
Israeli Ambassador served to frustrate Israel-Argentine relations even further and 
caused Israel to seek the support of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Wilcox. 
Before Secretary Wilcox could react, U.S. diplomats in Buenos Aires met their 
Argentine counterparts and relayed the message to Israel that the expulsion of 
the ambassador was “enough of a gesture” to satisfy  public dissent in 
Argentina.55  In August 1960, the situation normalized and Israel sent a new 
Ambassador to Buenos Aires. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Operation Eichmann represents a national goal with the highest degree of 
moral justification. While the choice to achieve that national goal through covert 
action can be contested, Israeli leaders did not debate the moral imperative 
associated with seeking justice against a man so deeply culpable for the near 
extermination of the entire Jewish race. With regard to domestic political risk, 
Ben-Gurion’s government faced far greater risk in not acting on a probably 
credible report on Eichmann’s whereabouts than from a covert attempt to capture 
him. The recent Kastner trial along with Kastner’s assassination in 1957 and 
public acquittal by Attorney General Cohen in 1958 had propelled Eichmann’s 
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name once again to the top of the list of iconic evil figures amongst a population 
that was still recovering from the horrors of the holocaust. It is not unreasonable 
to assume that Fritz Bauer or some other personally affected Jew would 
eventually divulge the Eichmann report to the Israeli public if it failed to gain any 
serious consideration in the government. While Harel does not mention Bauer’s 
indignation over the apparent lack of Israel action on Lothar Hermann’s report 
about Eichmann in 1957, some accounts of Bauer’s 1959 trip to Israel to meet 
with the foreign minister and attorney general paint the picture of a frustrated 
man looking for action.56   
In regard to domestic opinion, it would appear that Fearon’s notion of 
audience costs played a part in the Israeli decision to act covertly. Subsequently, 
the Argentine response to Israel was also driven largely by domestic concerns 
and a government bitterly fractured between the moderate President Frondizi 
and the fascist influenced foreign ministry that enjoyed the support of influential 
Argentine Catholic leaders. Israel either underestimated the influence of right-
wing elements of the Argentine government or hoped that public saber-rattling 
could be easily side-stepped through discrete diplomatic communications. 
Ranaan Rein’s description of the communication error between the states seems 
accurate:   
The Israeli public was completely baffled and occasionally astounded by 
Argentina’s adamant position throughout most of the crisis, apparently for two 
reasons. First, throughout the crisis Buenos Aires and Jerusalem dealt with the 
affair in completely different ways. Whereas Israel preferred a covert diplomacy, 
the Argentine authorities hurried to publish every diplomatic proceeding, whether 
for propaganda or because of leaks resulting from internal dissension and 
nationalist pressure…. Second, the centrality of the Holocaust in the Israeli 
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national consciousness made it difficult for many to grasp the possibility of a 
different perspective on the Eichmann affair.57 
Regardless of Israel’s miscalculation of the probable Argentine responses, 
the decision to capture Adolf Eichmann through covert action instead of seeking 
extradition, was in light of the circumstances and recent history with high profile 
war criminals in Latin America, a prudent one. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had 
every reason to believe that a request to extradite Eichmann, even with a near 
complete extradition treaty, had a high probability of resulting in Eichmann being 
tipped by sympathetic expatriate Germans or even right-wing elements in the 
Argentine Government. In this regard, the decision not to include the Israeli 
Ambassador to Argentina in planning the mission and post-mission response 
seems to have been a mistake. The Israeli Ambassador’s knowledge of 
Argentina’s key leaders, their political views, and the local social dynamics would 
have likely aided Ben-Gurion in better shaping the Israeli response to Argentina 
after the truth about the nature of the operation was discovered or surmised in 
the media.  
PM Ben-Gurion fared far better in calculating Israeli domestic support for 
Eichmann’s capture. Peter Malkin, one of the Mossad agents that captured 
Eichmann, later wrote a book about his exploits and noted the overwhelming 
public support: 
On our return, Israel was still in an uproar. The reaction to the capture had 
far exceeded even my wildest imaginings; there was nothing less than an 
explosion of national pride. It dominated the headlines, the airwaves, casual 
conversations. Flags and banners were everywhere. We had struck back! ran the 
unspoken theme. For the first time since the days of the Old Testament, we had 
risen in righteous fury!58 
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Peter Malkin was a Holocaust survivor whose sister, Fruma, died in a Nazi 
concentration camp. Many Jews alive in 1960, both inside Israel and abroad, had 
been deeply personally affected by the holocaust. In one single bold act, Ben-
Gurion was able to turn the collective emotional scar left by the holocaust into a 
nationalistic badge of honor for Israeli Jews. The Eichmann capture and 
subsequent trial and conviction served to further the development of a distinct 
Israeli national identity and solidify Ben-Gurion’s political strength. 
The fact that Fritz Bauer chose to travel to Israel with his information was 
a testament to his belief that West Germany also had little appetite for hunting 
Nazis and a vote of confidence that Israel did have an appetite for seeking 
justice. Dr. Bauer, as a prosecutor in the German Attorney General’s office, was 
well qualified to assess his government’s true desire for prosecuting Nazi’s. Fritz 
Bauer told Dr. Shinar, “I don’t know if we can altogether rely on the German 
judiciary here, let alone the German embassy staff in Buenos Aires….I see no 
other way but to turn to you.”59 Fritz Bauer went on to express his confidence in 
Israel’s ability to find Eichmann as well as his belief that Israel had the greatest 
stake in the matter. Bauer’s statements were both a vote of confidence for 
Israel’s capability and justification, but also a warning regarding the risk of trying 
to pursue Eichmann through bilateral legal relationships with West Germany. 
Bauer’s position on the matter helped to shape the Israeli course of action.  
The risk of any military conflict with Argentina, considering the vast 
distances between the two nations and Argentina’s poor military capability, was 
as insignificant as the “international condemnation” for violating Argentina’s 
sovereignty that was eloquently captured in the UN Security Council resolution. 
The fear that Israel would hurt the relative societal position of the almost 300,000 
Jews living in Argentina also proved to be a myth. That fear was likely born form 
a deep sense of Israeli regional isolation after the 1956 Arab-Israeli war and 
Israeli’s deep sense of obligation to Jewish enclaves around the world, many of 
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which were similarly comprised of holocaust survivors. Neither Ben-Gurion, nor 
Harel calculated that the Jewish lobby in the U.S. would play a role in compelling 
U.S. diplomats to mediate a resolution. Had Ben-Gurion better understood the 
relationships between Argentina, the U.S government and the Jewish enclaves in 
each location, he might have sought U.S. support for the covert action or even a 
more organized and deliberate mediation effort with Argentina immediately after 
the mission. While Operation Eichmann does not characterize the risk 
considerations of all covert actions, it does highlight the importance of a moral 
justification at least to the actors own domestic constituency. Additionally, the 
operation highlights the importance of understanding the domestic situation for all 
of the affected nations and considering that in war-gaming the possible response 
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III. WRATH OF GOD 
A. DISCUSSION 
On the morning of 5 September 1972, eight members of the Black September 
Organization (BSO), a little known group of Palestinian extremists, entered the 
athletes’ housing block of the Olympic village in Munich. Within 45 minutes, two 
members of the Israeli Olympic team were dead and nine more were hostages. 
BSO demanded the release of 234 Palestinians and two Germans held in Israeli 
and German prisons. By midnight on 5 September, all of the remaining hostages 
and five of the BSO members had been killed during a botched rescue attempt 
by inept German border police. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir determined that 
the Israeli athletes must be avenged and the Israeli government needed to send 
a message to the PLO that would deter future attacks against Israeli citizens 
abroad.  
The Israeli response to the Munich massacre was called ‘Operation Wrath 
of God’ and it began in earnest in October 1972. The operation, however, was 
strategically misguided. While public demand for retribution was visceral back in 
Israel, the government sanctioned an assassination campaign that failed to 
provide the Israeli public with a satisfactory display of retribution since the visible 
political heads of the PLO were purposely not targeted. The fact that Israel 
conducted public assassinations in Europe, far from its own borders and the 
heart of the Palestinian conflict, and that the initial targets selected were of 
questionable association with any terror activity, served to further obfuscate the 
goal of retribution against the BSO and its masters in the PLO. Israeli leaders 
also chose to conduct covert actions, as opposed to military strikes against PLO 
strongholds in Lebanon, thus preventing the Israeli government from claiming 
any responsibility for tactical successes against terrorist targets in Europe.  
Only after the debacle in Lillehammer, Norway when a Mossad team killed 
an innocent Moroccan immigrant and was subsequently arrested by local police 
was Israeli government sponsorship for the targeted killings fully exposed. 
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Additionally, the assassination campaign had no deterrent effect and, arguably, 
escalated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some historians, such as Samuel Katz, 
also argue that Israel’s collective pre-occupation with revenge for the Munich 
massacre lead to a singular focus in targeting the militant arm of the PLO and 
therefore took intelligence resources away from the larger regional conflicts with 
Egypt and Syria. According to Katz, the obsession with vengeance for Munich 
contributed to Israel being completely surprised on October 6th 1973 at the 
outside of the Yom Kippur War.60  Regardless of whether Operation Wrath of 
God contributed to the intelligence failure in predicting the Yom Kippur War, the 
operation culminated with the debacle at Lillehammer, Norway and is known as 
the “Michdal” (Hebrew for non-performance or neglect) amongst Israeli security 
officials.61  The capture of Mossad agents in Lillehammer was a direct result of 
poor decisions made by Mossad leadership and stands as a testament to the 
sense of over-confidence and poor assessments of potential strategic effects of 
covert actions that plagued the Wrath of God operation in spite of any tactical 
successes.  
This chapter will analyze the decisions made by Israeli leaders prior to and 
throughout Operation Wrath of God and compare the stated goals of the 
operation with the results. First, the strategic context will be outlined. The 
massacre at the Munich Olympics and the events afterward must be viewed in 
the greater context of the Arab-Israeli struggle that began with the Zionist 
movement in Palestine after WWI when the entire region was under British 
control as a result of the implementation of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement62. 
The violent conflict for land and influence in Palestine began under the British 
mandate, but evolved into a regional conflict with neighboring Arab states after 
Israeli independence from Britain in 1948. During the earlier stages of the 
struggle for control over Palestine, the Jews proved to be significantly more 
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organized and operated with a greater sense of unity of purpose, giving them a 
distinct advantage over their Arab neighbors. As the struggle continued, an 
innovative and well-organized Palestinian threat evolved under Yassir Arafat and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization. The threat of effective organized violence 
from PLO forces, backed by Arab governments in the region, reached its height 
between 1968 and 1973. .  
After the strategic context and the critical events that led up to the Munich 
attack are outlined, the remainder of the chapter will discuss the cycle of violence 
between Israel and the PLO and its agents that continued after Munich and 
culminated with the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. The chapter will focus on 
the four key Israeli missions under Operation Wrath of God that set the tone for 
the overall operation and were crucial benchmarks to measure the success of the 
operation. The first two missions to kill Wael Zwaiter in Rome and Dr. Hamshari 
in Paris are discussed as they represent a mismatch of the strategic goal of 
retribution. Neither target was directly tied to Munich or significantly tied to any 
terror activity, at least not in a public enough manner to fulfill any strategic 
communication goal with the people of Israel. The third mission, Operation 
Spring of Youth, appears to have been the most successful in striking PLO 
operational leadership and was conducted in Beirut at the heart of the conflict 
between Israel and the PLO. Spring of Youth seemed to fulfill the strategic goals 
of justice from acts of retribution, deterrence, and prevention of terror attacks. 
The last mission in Lillehammer, Norway in July 1973 was both a strategic and 
tactical failure and essentially ended Operation Wrath of God. Lastly, the chapter 
will compare the results of Operation Wrath of God with the its goals and 
evaluate whether the goals were met and if not, why? 
B. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
Operation Wrath of God can be viewed as one episode in the Arab-Israeli 
struggle for control in Palestine that began with the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
after World War 1. While the conflict has evolved significantly and continues 
today, for the purposes of this thesis, the relevant strategic context began with 
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the British mandate in 1918 and ended with the onset of the Yom Kippur War 
between Israel and the combined forces of Egypt and Syria on October 6th, 
1973. The period between 1918 and 1973 can be broken into three logical 
phases: British Mandate from 1918 to Israeli independence in 1948. During the 
mandate period, both the Jewish and Arab constituents under British authority 
organized politically and militarily as the competition for land and influence 
polarized the conflict. The second phase of the conflict began after Israeli 
independence in 1948 and continued through the 1967 “6 Day War.”  During the 
second phase, the conflict evolved into a regional struggle, played out through a 
sense of Arab solidarity with the displaced Palestinians, but essentially as a state 
struggle between Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon on one side and Israel on 
the other. During this phase, the PLO was established (in 1964) and acted as an 
unofficial proxy for the Arab states opposed to Israel. The third phase of the 
conflict began after Israel seized significant portions of the Golan Heights, Gaza 
strip and West Bank during the 6 Day War and retained those lands to create a 
larger security zone and buffer against its violent neighbors. During this phase, 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were displaced and the conflict between 
Israel and the PLO escalated and spread through Europe, Asia and Africa.  
The timeline in Figure 2 establishes the approximate period during which 





Figure 2.  Arab-Israeli Conflict 1918-1973 
The first phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be viewed as a period of 
polarization between the Jewish population and the Palestinian Arabs during the 
British mandate from 1918 to 1948. The second phase begins with the defacto 
establishment of Israel as a nation in 1948 after Jewish forces defeated 
Palestinian Arabs in a struggle for control of the former British mandate. During 
the second phase of the conflict, the disenfranchised Palestinians were clustered 
along the borders of Israel and neighboring Arab states. Palestinians found 
refuge, resources and training from their Arab brothers and a wider regional 
conflict evolved between Israel and the Arabs. This conflict culminated with the 
overwhelming Israeli victory during the Six-Day War in 1967. The third phase of 
the conflict began in the aftermath of the 6 days War as thousands of 
Palestinians were forced in refugee camps and Palestinian leaders from various 
factions struggled internally to lead the armed and emerging political struggle 
against Israel on behalf of the Palestinian people. This phase of the struggle saw 
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an escalation of Palestinian terror style attacks aimed at exploiting the media and 
capitalizing propaganda effects to generate world-wide awareness about the 
Palestinian cause. Israel responded in kind, and spectacular violence between 
the two sides escalated. Arab states continued to support and use the 
Palestinian struggle for their own purposes, however, their ability to truly exert 
control over the Palestinian diaspora waned as Yassir Arafat rose to head of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. The third phase culminated with the Yom 
Kippur War in October 1973 when the combined forces of Egypt, Syria and a 
token PLO contingent attacked Israel, taking them completely by surprise. Israel 
won the brief war, but at significantly greater cost in lives and material than six 
years prior.63  
C. WRATH OF GOD TIMELINE 
The timeline in Figure 3 shows the Israeli actions taken as part of Wrath of 
God (tan shaded boxes below the line).  
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Figure 3.  Wrath of God Timeline 
 
The timeline begins with the May 1972 attack at Ben-Gurion airport in Lod. 
This is due to the fact that Lod represented a shift in the PLO approach to 
fighting Israel. For the first time, the PLO collaborated with foreign extremists and 
targeted civilians directly in order to exploit the media and incite fear rather than 
target official Israeli figures or installations. Prior to Lod the PFLP had conducted 
several aircraft hijacking in order to broker the release of Palestinian prisoners, 
but Israel began a sky marshal program and installed X-ray machines at luggage 
check-ins to increase security on their flights, forcing the PLO to adapt their 
tactics. Lod was a huge boost to PLO recruiting and morale and foreshadowed 
the next more spectacular attack in Munich. While Lod was collaboration with the 
Japanese Red Army on Israeli soil, Munich was collaboration with the Baader-
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Meinhof leftist group on foreign soil. The only non-Palestinians on the hostage 
takers prisoner release demand were two members of the Meinhof gang.  
The Israeli actions taken as part of the larger counter-guerilla efforts in 
Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and inside Israeli occupied territories are not listed; 
however it is important to keep in mind that Palestinian attacks against Israel and 
Israeli attacks against suspected militants continued in the region. The active 
regional conflict between Israeli forces and Palestinian para-militaries produced 
far more casualties and kinetic damage than the clandestine operations. Wrath of 
God represented another front in the Arab-Israeli conflict and is often referred to 
as the “War of Spooks.”64  The Palestinian actions are listed in the orange boxes 
to the left/above the timeline. While not listed on the timeline since it did not 
target Israel, the March 8, 1973 attack by BSO on the Saudi Embassy in 
Khartoum was one of the most infamous BSO attacks from a western 
perspective.  
During the attack two U.S. Ambassadors and a Belgian diplomat were 
killed. Yezid Sayigh proposes that the backlash from this attack, more than any 
other single event, convinced Yasir Arafat to seek greater control over his militant 
factions and end the spectacular terror campaign outside of the Middle East.65  
The timeline ends with the onset of the Yom Kippur war in October 1973. While 
the war did not resolve the Palestinian issue, the Israeli focus returned to the 
regional conflict against para-military forces and militias in the occupied 
territories. At the same time, the PLO emerged from the 1973 war as a more 
cohesive and unified entity than ever before. Arafat’s efforts to tighten control 
were taking shape and he sought to pursue more traditional political and military 
pressure to gain control of the occupied territories instead of extra-regional terror 
attacks.66 
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D. MISSION 
The Munich massacre represented a huge lapse in security with respect to 
the Israeli government. The Israeli security services were completely surprised 
by the BSO attack, which had been planned several months in advance. The fact 
that Palestinian militants were able to plan, train for, and then execute such a 
sophisticated hostage event without any Israeli intelligence service knowing was 
a complete shock to Israel. Aaron Klein described the Munich attack as a 
“dividing line, separating history into ‘before Munich’ and ‘after Munich’.67 Israeli 
public confidence in the government and the Labor party, which Prime Minister 
Golda Meir represented, was shaken.  
Most notably, the Mossad chief Zvi Zamir had traveled to Germany during 
the Munich crisis in an attempt to convince the German government to allow the 
Israeli counterterror force, the Sayaret (Unit), to conduct a hostage rescue. Zamir 
failed to convince the Germans and the result was an absolutely botched 
attempt, by untrained German police, to conduct a high risk hostage rescue that, 
if conducted by a nation today, would only be conducted by the most elite 
counter-terror units.68   On 6 September, Zvi Zamir returned to Israel and within 
an hour after landing was in a cabinet meeting with PM Meir, Defense Minister 
Moshe Dayan and the Deputy Prime Minister for Education, Culture and Sports. 
Emotions ran high as Zvi Zamir recounted his experience from the last 24 hours: 
The ministers were livid. A response was necessary. But many 
were frustrated: Who will we retaliate against? Who will we hit? 
Who are the commanding officers of the Black September group? 
Do they even have bases?  By the meeting’s end they had decided 
on the air strikes and the subsequent ground assault [against 
known PLO camps in Lebanon], but all present recognized the 
need to go beyond the standard retaliatory script.69 
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The political pressures were palpable for PM Meir’s government. PM Meir 
tried to avoid engaging her opponents in the Knesset on the subject of internal 
inquiries and investigations to answer why the attack had been a complete 
surprise. The Israeli government, and particularly the Mossad, had been 
embarrassed by the fact that their athletes had been such easy targets and the 
Israeli public was losing confidence that their current government could keep the 
population safe in Europe. In less than a week after the Munich incident, two 
more Israeli citizens were killed in letter bombs in Brussels and London.70  From 
a domestic perspective in Israel, the world had turned upside down, and the 
previously local-regional conflict between the displaced Palestinian diaspora and 
the government of Israel had spilled into Western Europe, an area that had 
previously been seen as safe by members of either side. The government 
seemed paralyzed and ineffective in the Israeli public view immediately following 
Munich. The Prime Minister ordered a cursory investigation later known as the 
Koppel Commission and as a result she fired 3 officials after the incident.71  The 
report was vague and of little real value in identifying any institutional that 
accounted for Munich. Essentially, the Koppel report was an attempt to satisfy a 
measure of public outrage and political opposition with a few low-level 
scapegoats. PM Meir was not actually interested in blame or infighting that would 
surely weaken the government.  
Instead, PM Meir attempted to unify and rally the political and domestic 
populace with rousing speeches and prophetic statements about Israel’s moral 
obligation to fight terrorism:   
The actions and ways of the terrorists are continually evolving. It is 
our duty to prepare ourselves for this type of war, more than we 
have been to this day – methodically, knowledgeably, decisively, 
and expansively; this a dangerous and critical task. From the blood-
drenched history of the Jewish nation, we learn that violence which 
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begins with the murder of Jews ends with the spread of violence 
and danger to all people, in all nations.72 
While PM Meir certainly believed it was her solemn duty to avenge the 
deaths of athletes, it is also likely that she wanted to capitalize on and focus the 
public’s attention on the path ahead and garner support for any Israeli actions 
taken in response to Munich while avoiding internal squabbling that could be 
used to fracture her control. In the same September 12th speech to the Knesset, 
PM Meir would close saying “We have no choice but to strike at terrorist 
organizations wherever we can reach them. That is our obligation to ourselves 
and to peace. We shall fulfill that obligation undauntedly.”73   
PM Meir still had to play the politics of Israel, which at that time evolved 
around the Palestinian issue. The right-wing opposition leader of the Herut party, 
Menachem Begin, denounced PM Meir’s statement and demanded an official 
committee of inquiry be established to find those whose negligence allowed the 
events at Munich to unfold without any warning. Similar responses came from 
Knesset members on the far left as well.74  The one notion that earned 
consensus in the Knesset was that the typical retaliatory strikes into Syria and 
Lebanon would not suffice. Even Menachem Begin called for “a prolonged, open-
ended assault against the murderers and their bases,” and stated further “we 
must stifle all of their plans and operations, and snuff out the existence of these 
murderous organizations…..We need to run these criminals and murderers off 
the face of the earth, to render them fearful, no longer able to initiate violence. If 
we need a special unit to do this, then now is the time to build it.”75  Regardless 
of why the Israelis failed to predict the attacks at Munich, PM Meir had carte 
blanch support across the government to act decisively and arguably had no 
choice if she wanted to maintain control over her government and any measure 
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of popular support. PM Meir immediately appointed retired Major General Aharon 
Yariv as the new prime minister on terrorism and tasked him to draft a new 
counter-terror strategy with Mossad chief Zvi Zamir.  
 The plan took only a couple of weeks to develop and focused 
foremost on prevention of future attacks and secondly on deterrence of current 
terrorist and their support network. Both the prevention and deterrence aspects 
were tied to the notion that very bold and public assassinations would create an 
increased costs perception for current PLO members and further deter 
prospective recruits from joining.76  Additionally, only operational members of the 
BSO or Fatah were to be targeted as this would have the greatest impact on 
reducing the PLO’s militant capabilities and thwarting future attacks. Besides 
deterrence, the assassinations would also serve to fulfill the need for prophetic 
justice that PM Meir believed was woven into the national identity of a people 
who survived the holocaust. The fact that the massacre of Israelis happened 
once again on German soil while many in Israel could still remember the 
holocaust added a great deal more value to notion of justice based on 
Hamarabi’s code.77   
Key Israeli government officials could not agree on how to respond to the 
incident. Abba Eban, the foreign minister, stated that the Israeli response should 
be constrained to the Middle East; however, several other current and former 
government officials saw the need to fight terrorism in Europe, since that was 
where Israeli’s were at the most risk. Amihai Paglin, the former operations chief 
of the Irgun (the pre-independence Israeli paramilitary force), was arrested at the 
end of September 1972 for smuggling weapons and explosives intended for use 
against Arabs in Europe.78 Israeli public opinion was leaning heavily toward 
revenge in a European battleground and the Israeli Prime Minister’s office was 
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listening. The fact that BSO continued to target Israeli officials and offices in 
Europe throughout the month of September 1972 also helped to influence the 
focus of retaliatory efforts toward BSO and later the PLO at large in Europe.  
Only five days after the Munich attack, a Mossad agent was shot during a 
meeting with his informant in Brussels. The BSO knew that Israel would be 
hungry for any leads regarding the Munich attack and used that information 
advantage to lure Tzadok Ophir to a meeting where a Mohammed Rabah, a 
Moroccan emigrant, promised to reveal information about BSO. Instead, Rabah 
shot Ophir four times at close range. Luckily, Ophir survived.79  Regardless of 
where the focus of retaliation would lie, PM Meir knew that Israel had to react 
more swiftly and severely than ever before, both to satisfy the public and to 
counter the real threat to Israeli security that had taken shape in the BSO. 
The next task was to determine exactly who was responsible for directing 
and planning the attack in Munich. The attack highlighted the Israelis’ lack of 
knowledge about the BSO as a PLO subsidiary and even more importantly, the 
Israeli intelligence services’ complete lack of sources with access to the PLO’s 
larger international network. Days after Munich, the Mossad’s analytic Tzomet 
division quadrupled with newly reassigned and conscripted personnel. Similarly, 
the Aman (military intelligence) Branch 4 established an Overseas Terrorism 
department almost overnight. They installed Televisions to monitor Arab media 
and a new computer, the first of its kind in the Aman, to process thousands of 
raw intelligence reports and begin the task of piecing together the clandestine 
structures of the PLO. The chief of Branch 4, Lieutenant Colonel Mor, noted that: 
the massacre at Munich helped us understand that we would have 
to deal with a new subject that we had never before encountered – 
terror attacks against Israeli targets abroad…an attack on foreign 
territory gave the Palestinians a distinct advantage. They received 
international attention and our job to root out terrorists and prevent 
future attacks got that much harder. In terms of intelligence 
gathering, it meant starting from scratch, from the foundations. We 
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didn’t have hard, dependable facts. The massacre came as a 
complete shock; it knocked us off our feet and forced us to act 
under immense pressure.80   
In the end, Israeli intelligence loosened the typical reporting scrutiny used 
to separate fact from hearsay and developed a list names of personnel either 
currently employed by BSO or suspected to have been involved in planning the 
Munich operation.  
Originally, a list of 11 names, was created as an initial target list for Wrath 
of God; eleven Palestinian targets were chosen, one for each Israeli killed in 
Munich In theory, all of the names on the list were supposed to be associated 
with the Munich plot. The names were generated only after the combined 
intelligence teams of the Mossad and Aman submitted dossiers to a committee, 
Committee X. PM Meir chaired the committee and acted as the final approval for 
what was an automatic death sentence during a pseudo-trial of suspected 
terrorists in the dossiers.81  The head of the Mossad acted as prosecutor in the 
trial. The Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon also 
sat on the committee and acted as judges along with the Prime Minister.82   
Little else is actually known about the proceedings of Committee X since 
no official records were kept. Accounts from personal interviews also claim that 
even after sentencing, PM Meir would reserve approval of the assassination 
operation only after hearing the details of the plan and feeling assured that no 
innocents would be injured.83  From the beginning however, the arbitrary 
assignment of “11 names” did not address the goal of prevention. The BSO and 
its parent organization were large complex networks distributed throughout 
Europe and the Middle East. Eleven mid-level PLO members was not going to 
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impact an organization with several hundred members in Europe and several 
thousand more in the Middle East. 84 
E. THE LIST  
1. Ali Hassan Salameh  aka  “The Red Prince”    
Salameh, according to Palestinian sources, was a rising star in the PLO 
and a former member of the Fatah’s elite al-Fatah Jihaz el-Razd (Razd) 
reconnaissance and sabotage unit. The Razd was known for its cunning and 
ruthless tactics.85  While in the Razd, Salameh was subordinate to Salah Khalaf 
aka Abu Iyad, however after Black September in 1970, Razd was disbanded and 
Khalaf fell out of favor with Arafat. Arafat chose Salameh to form a new 
clandestine commando unit, the BSO. Salameh was responsible for the BSO and 
synchronizing its operations with Fatah and the PLO, and therefore the most 
culpable person on Mossad’s list. Khalaf was later subordinated to Salameh. He 
also coordinated independent operations using the BSO moniker. Salameh was 
also primarily located in Beirut with a large security detail and considered to be a 
hard target by the Israelis. Salameh gained notoriety for BSO after coordinating 
the killing of Jordanian Prime Minister Tal on November 28, 1971.86 
2. Abu Daoud  
Daoud was a principal planner for the Munich operation. Daoud was 
extremely savvy and never allowed himself to be located long enough for 
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Mossad to plan an operation. Later, Daoud would admit to his involvement in the 
Munich operation.87 
3. Dr. Mahmoud Hamshari 
PLO representative to France and alleged coordinator for PLO militant 
activity in Europe. Dr. Hamshari was a declared foreign diplomat in Paris and an 
intellectual and considered a threat mostly due to his relationship with the leftist 
PFLP faction.88 
4. Wael Zwaiter  
Yasir Arafat’s 2nd cousin and employee of the Libyan Embassy in Rome. 
Alleged coordinator for PLO militant activity in Europe. Poet, socialite and 
aspiring actor. Most recent efforts included translating One Thousand One Nights 
from Arabic to Italian. 
5. Dr. Basil Raoud al-Kubaisi  aka Bassel Rauf Kubeisy 
  Facilitator for Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP). 
Kubaisi is described as a “life-long revolutionary” and was responsible for 
attempting to assassinate King Feisal of Iraq in 1956 and Israel PM Meir in New 
York in March 1973.89  Kubaisi was mainly responsible for BSO logistics and 
communications in Europe. 
6. Kamal Nasser 
Official spokesman for the PLO in Beirut. Killed during Operation Spring of 
Youth on April 10th, 1973. 
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7. Kemal Adwan (Udwan)  
Chief of al-Fatah sabotage operations (Western Wing) in occupied 
territories. Maintained records of many PLO clandestine operations and militant 
activities. Killed during Spring of Youth on April 10, 1973. The capture of his 
personal files gave the Israeli’s key information about Fatah’s clandestine 
network in the occupied territories and Fatah’s recent efforts to coordinate 
activities with PLFP.90   
8. Abu Yussuf, aka Mahmoud Yussuf Najjer   
PLO general committee member (high ranking PLO member). Acted as 
PLO’s foreign minister and member of Arafat’s inner circle. Killed during Spring of 
Youth on April 10, 1973. His loss forced the PLO to restructure its security and 
forced Arafat to mend relations and bring Salah Khalaf back into the inner 
circle.91  Several sources claim Abu Yussuf was the intellectual force behind 
many of the BSO’s worldwide attacks, including the assassination of the 
Jordanian PM, the Munich massacre and the Bangkok embassy attack.92  Also a 
founding member of Fatah and the second in command of Fatah in April 1973.93 
9. Mohammed Boudia  
PLO member responsible for coordinating European operations 
10. Hussein Abad al-Chir   
PLO contact with Russian KGB in Cyprus 
11. Dr. Wadi Haddad:   
Member of PLFP and coordinator for militant actions. Inner circle of PLFP. 
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F. The First Target:  Wael Zwaiter 
The goal of undertaking morally justified operations that would deter and 
preventfuture terror attacks, were not well supported by the initial target list 
generated by Committee X. The first two targets, Wael Zwaiter and Dr. Mahmoud 
Hamshari, were not clearly linked to Black September or even any form of 
violence sanctioned by the PLO or any other group. [Mentioned above] Zwaiter is 
described as a “low-key quiet man who loved literature.”94  He had been an extra 
in several movies, including a brief speaking role in Peter Sellers’ Pink Panther 
and up until his death on October 16, 1972, he was working on an Arabic-to-
Italian translation of the anonymous Arab classic One Thousand and One Nights.  
On the evening of October 16th, 1972, Wael Zwaiter ate dinner with his 
European girlfriend, Janet Brown, at her house and then took a bus to his 
neighborhood on the Piazza Annibaliano in northern Rome. He stopped in a local 
bar only two blocks from his house to make a phone call and buy cigarettes. 
Wael lived a modest life and his phone in the apartment had been shut off due to 
unpaid bills. It was approximately 2230 hours when Wael walked the rest of the 
way to his apartment. Wael walked into the foyer of his apartment and was 
immediately confronted by two men. The men shot Wael 12 times at close range 
with silenced .22 caliber Beretta pistols, the preferred weapon of Mossad 
Caesera agents. A small Fiat 125 waited exactly two 90-degree turns from 
Wael’s apartment for the two assassins. Wael died almost instantly and within 
four hours, the entire Mossad team had left Italy without incident.  The 
operation was a complete tactical success;  the target was eliminated, the entire 
Mossad team recovered without incident, and aside from the fact that Wael was 
killed with the signature tool of the Mossad, no evidence was left behind. The 
Rome papers did report the next morning that Wael Zwaiter’s death was likely 
“politically driven” and “carried out by a Jewish group.”95  The real question was 
whether Wael Zwaiter’s death actually supported the strategic goals of 
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prevention and morally justified deterrence. It appeared that Zwaiter’s biggest 
crime was being Yassir Arafat’s cousin. Abu Daoud, the official leader of BSO 
stated:   
I challenge the Israeli government, or any of its departments, to 
prove that Wael Zwaiter, the philosopher who carries books and not 
guns, had anything to do with the Munich operation,’ said Abu 
Daoud, a leader of Black September. ‘Zwaiter had contacts in all 
the Italian political parties. He was … a philosopher, not an armed 
freedom fighter. They killed him because they wanted to kill off any 
kind of positive image of the Palestinian cause in Europe.96 
The Israeli’s claimed that Zwaiter was involved with BSO and even played 
a key role in an August 1972 plot to blow up an El Al Airline 707. 97  Israel never 
actually produced any evidence linking Zwaiter to any criminal or terror acts, and 
while it is believable that his sympathies would have rested with the Palestinian 
cause, his public persona was that of a budding poet and humble aspiring 
socialite. Aaron Klein claims that “uncorroborated and improperly cross-
referenced intelligence information tied him to the support network of Black 
September in Rome. From there, a slippery slope led the politically active, low-
level saya’an to the Mossad’s hit list.”98  Zwaiter was, however, an easy target 
with personal ties to Arafat, the man ultimately responsible for Munich and much 
more. The next day, Palestinian radio stations, seeking to gain a propaganda 
advantage, announced Zwaiter as a “shahid” [martyr] and a hero. The 
announcement claimed he was killed by Zionist intelligence and further stated, 
“Fatah stresses again that the pursuit and assassination of our fighters will only 
increase its determination to carry on with its struggle and revolution.”99 
 Wael Zwaiter’s death did little to deter PLO militant actions. During 
the same month as his death, over 100 letter bombs were sent to various Israeli 
offices in Europe and other places. Fourteen letter bombs went to the United 
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Kingdom, killing one Israeli employee at their Embassy in London.100  Most of 
the letter bombs, fortunately, were intercepted due to recently implemented 
security procedures. 
G. THE SECOND TARGET:  DR. MAHMUD HAMSHARI 
Dr. Hamshari was killed in Paris in December 1972 by explosives planted 
in his telephone by Israeli agents. Hamshari died almost 3 weeks later in the 
hospital and revealed several facts to the police before his death that would bring 
Israeli involvement to the forefront of international politics and strain Israel- 
European relations further.101   Dr. Hamshari was a harder target than Zwaiter 
since he had official diplomatic status and usually traveled with a security guard. 
In an effort to avoid a shootout in the streets of Paris, the Mossad team 
determined that a more nuanced plan was required to kill Dr. Hamshari. In early 
December 1972 Mossad arranged for workmen to accidentally damage the 
phone line outside Hamshari’s house. Additionally an asset posing as an Italian 
journalist had also recently contacted Hamshari and expressed his desire to set 
up a time for an interview. A Mossad agent, posing as a telephone repair man, 
then clandestinely installed a small explosive device into Hamshari’s phone. On 
December 8th, when Hamshari answered the phone, the Italian journalist asked 
if he was speaking with Dr. Hamshari. Upon confirmation of Hamshari’s name, 
the explosive was detonated.102   
Hamshari was the official PLO representative to France and was a 
respected scholar with no obvious ties to the Munich incident or Black 
September. Still, after the killing, the Israeli government claimed that Hamshari 
was involved with BSO.103  The fact that Israel officially denounced involvement 
in the killings probably precluded them from producing any evidence, if they had 
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it, to justify the action. While Hamshari was not a viable target with respect to the 
retribution aspect of the Munich response, he was more operationally relevant 
than Wael Zwaiter. Hamshari, besides being the PLO’s emissary in Paris, was 
closely involved with the often violent PFLP faction and he had been tied to an 
aborted attempt on PM Ben-Gurion’s life in 1969.104  Regardless of past 
transgressions suspected by Israeli intelligence, the fact remains that the first two 
targets of Wrath of God were diplomats in Europe and generally considered to be 
law abiding citizens by the host nations. In the eyes of the world, Israel had just 
murdered two innocent men. The concept of legitimate revenge based on the 
biblical ‘eye for an eye’ violated with respect to the Munich massacre.  
 The PLO was adamant to respond in kind to Israel and a cycle of 
violence ensued with renewed intensity after Hamshari’s death. Ali Hassan, the 
PLO’s charismatic second in charge, ordered BSO to kill Israeli agents and 
conduct more ‘spectacular’ attacks abroad. The first notable event was when four 
BSO operatives stormed the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, intending to take the 
Israeli Ambassador hostage. Instead, they happened upon the visiting Israeli 
Ambassador to Cameroon and several staff members. Thai officials convinced 
the BSO members to take a flight back to Egypt and the event, while 
internationally spectacular, had little bloodshed.105  Shortly thereafter, the BSO 
began killing Israeli intelligence agents in Europe. The “spy master” Baruch 
Cohen was killed in Madrid in January 1973 by a young Palestinian student he 
was attempting to recruit. The student was really a BSO member and tasked by 
BSO leader Abu Iyad to kill the Israeli agent.106  
In addition to targeted killings, BSO sent another wave of letter bombs in 
January to multiple Israeli diplomatic outposts. In March 1973, BSO killed 
another Mossad agent in Cyprus and then two more agents in Paris and Nicosia 
a few weeks later. Probably the boldest attack was the BSO’s attempt to shoot 
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down PM Meir’s jet on its approach to Rome international airport in late January 
1973. PM Meir was enroute to visit the Pope and Ali Hassan learned about her 
impending visit a few weeks earlier from suspected KGB contacts. The Israeli 
security only learned about the attack a few hours before the PM was to arrive in 
Rome. The attack was thwarted less than an hour before the PM’s plane was to 
land by the bold actions of an observant Israeli agent that noticed a suspicious 
food service truck outside the airport. After a brief dramatic vehicle interdiction, 
authorities found several Soviet STRELLA rockets in the truck.107  The rockets 
were acquired through PLO contacts with the KGB in Cyprus and smuggled in on 
Ali Hassan’s personal yacht. Ali Hassan remained safely in Lebanon during the 
operation.108   The cyclic of violence continued in earnest throughout the rest of 
1973, culminating with another Arab-Israeli war later that fall. Operation Wrath of 
God did not deter terror attacks against Israelis.  Instead, it actually gave the 
PLO increased incentive to step up the pace and intensity of their operations 
against Israel.  
H. SPRING OF YOUTH, APRIL 10, 1973 
Spring of Youth (SoY) stands out from the other targeted killings 
associated with Wrath of God. SoY was the only mission conducted as a military 
raid with the IDF’s elite Sayaret Maktal with support from Mossad, IDF naval 
forces and paratroopers. Spring of Youth was also the only mission conducted in 
the PLO sanctuary of Beirut and in addition targeted senior PLO personnel as 
well as key facilities. IDF soldiers also seized several documents from Udwan’s 
home, which Udwan’s aide would later say was a “complete catastrophe” since 
they contained vital information about the PLO’s clandestine militant 
operations.109  SoY had an immediate and significant impact on the PLO and 
forced Arafat to replace key leaders and rebuild the internal security of his 
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organization.110  Arafat had to replace three members of his inner circle and 
address the loss of sensitive operational and security information. 
Besides the fact that the Israelis targeted significant PLO figures and not 
just middle men, Spring of Youth used all of the available military and intelligence 
capabilities that Israel had. From its inception, the Israeli leadership believed they 
would only get one chance to surprise the PLO inner circle in their Beirut 
sanctuary. The operation required weeks of detailed planning and rehearsals by 
the Sayaret, while Mossad agents conducted surveillance of the targets as well 
as the infiltration point on a private hotel beach on the outskirts of Beirut. 
Knowing that the assault forces would need to infiltrate past Lebanese military 
and PLO armed security, a well-orchestrated plan was developed to infiltrate the 
Sayaret commandos in pairs with one commando, the smallest of the pair, 
dressed in drag. All weapons and ammunition were carefully concealed in the 
each operator’s garments. Mossad agents had rehearsed driving routes to and 
from the hotel beach to designated drop off points in Beirut.  
On the night of April 9th, IDF missile boats floated several miles off shore 
and unloaded naval commandos and Sayaret soldiers onto small rubber boats. 
The men landed on the beach without incident and under the cover of total 
darkness. Minutes later, Sayaret Maktal soldiers dressed as happy tourist 
couples piled into three waiting Buicks driven by Mossad agents who had been 
conducting detailed surveillance of the targets, routes and local security forces. 
The targets were Kamal Nasser (PLO official spokesman), Kemal Adwan (Fatah 
key leader), and Abu Yussuf (PLO foreign minister and confidant of Arafat). 
Within 30 minutes from landing on the beach, the teams had infiltrated into Beirut 
through police and PLO checkpoints, entered the two target buildings and killed 
all three targets while, captured several important PLO documents and returned 
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to the beach without losing any soldiers. One team was forced to engage a 
Lebanese Gendarme vehicle , killing the occupants. 111 
Besides meeting the tactical objective of killing the targets, the team 
recovered what was later called “a gold-mine of documents” from Kemal Adwan’s 
apartment.112  The most significant immediate gain for Israel was the fact that 
the PLO would need to pause and replace two key military commanders, Adwan 
and Yussuf. Kamal Nasser was a more difficult target to justify from a military 
perspective and even harder to measure with regard to the actual operational 
benefit gained from his death. He was, after all, only the political spokesman and 
his relevance as a military target was debated in committee X for several weeks. 
In the end, he was targeted because of his prominent role as a public voice for 
the PLO and the fact that the PLO did not distinguish military functions from 
political ones.113  Essentially, Nasser promoted the PLO violent extremists 
agenda and was considered a combatant. Perhaps the greatest benefit for Israel 
resulting from SoY was the psychological impact on the Palestinian population. 
Israel had, after all struck deep into the Lion’s den, killed three prominent leaders 
and disappeared again without a trace. The clandestine infiltration was not 
Israel’s typical tactic when attacking Palestinian targets in the region. Later the 
Palestinians would call SoY “Amaliyat Vardun”(Mission Vardun) and the notion 
that Israel could strike anywhere would be instilled in the Palestinian psyche.114  
I. THE LAST MISSION:  LILLEHAMMER 
In early July 1973, Israeli intelligence believed they knew where Ali 
Hassan Salameh, aka the Red Prince, would travel to next. By the summer of 
1973, Mossad was certain that Salameh was the most significant operational 
leader in Fatah associated with Munich and knew that he was Arafat’s chosen 
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successor. The Red Prince was, by modern standards, a true high value target. 
Salameh was also well guarded and difficult to track, so when Mossad sources 
divulged that Salameh was traveling to Norway, Mossad reacted. Mike Harrari, 
the commander of Mossad’s Caesara unit and lead planner for Wrath of God, 
took personal command of the proposed mission to kill Salameh in Norway. 
Harrari did not know what Salameh’s purpose was in Norway, but believed that 
Salameh was coordinating some yet undetermined attack in Scandinavia. 
Another possible story was that Salameh was planning a major attack in 
Cyprus in response to Israel forcing Libyan Airlines flight #114 to crash land in 
February 1973 in Israel because the aircraft had deviated into Israeli controlled 
airspace, likely due to severe weather and navigation errors. Israeli officials could 
not make radio contact with the aircraft due to weather and believed it was on a 
terror mission. The order was given to shoot it down and 108 of 113 passengers 
were killed.115 116  All Mossad really knew by July 14th, was that a young 
Algerian, believed to be BSO’s liaison in Europe, was traveling to Oslo, Norway 
and was reportedly intending to meet with his boss, Salameh.117  Mossad 
officials also knew that they would have to act quickly to prevent a possible terror 
attack and catch their most lucrative target yet in the open. By July 18th, Mossad 
surveillance learned that their Algerian suspect was enroute from Oslo to 
Lillehammer, Norway. Mike Harrari hastily assembled a team of Mossad agents, 
not the typical Caesara trained combatants and none with local Norwegian 
linguistic skills or area familiarity.  
By July 20th, one of the Mossad agents believed he saw Salameh leaving 
a café on a bicycle. Part of the problem, however, was that Salameh was rarely 
seen in public and most Mossad intelligence about his location was second hand. 
As Aaron Klein states, “the decision to crown the man in the café as Ali Hassan 
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Salameh was made on the basis of very slim intelligence. The available 
information was certainly insufficient to authorize an assassination.”118  
Convinced that they had their man, Caesara commander Harrari approved the 
operation and had two of his combatants flown in to conduct the hit. The two 
men, dark skinned combatants, drove a rental car from Oslo to the small town of 
Lillehammer on July 21st. They likely stood out in the mostly Scandinavian town 
of circa 20,000 inhabitants. Earlier that day surveillance had observed a blond 
haired pregnant woman accompanying their quarry.  
That evening the pair, who were clearly a couple, went to a movie theater 
to watch Where Eagles Dare , a World War II movie starring Clint Eastwood and 
Richard Burton.119  After the movie, the couple boarded a bus and then got off 
and walked down Porobakakan Street to their house. The combatants stopped 
their car, got out and shot the man 10 times at close range with their .22 caliber 
Beretta pistols. They then got back in their vehicle and sped away. A neighbor 
observed the incident from her window and called the police, who arrived within 
three minutes. The man died later that night after arriving at the hospital. The 
dead man was Achmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan immigrant and waiter at a local 
café. Bouchiki was married to a Norwegian woman. The pair lived in Lillehammer 
and was expecting their first child in two months.  
The Mossad escape plan was for the team to travel in separate vehicles 
back to Oslo that night after having sanitized their apartments in Lillehammer. 
They were also supposed to return the rental cars and hide in the capital city for 
a few days before leaving. The next day, Dan Art and Marianne Gladnikoff, two 
Mossad assets hastily recruited for the mission due to one’s language ability and 
the other’s regional knowledge of Scandinavia, were arrested at Pornavo Airport 
while trying to return one of the rental vehicles used for the operation. The 
vehicle had run a roadblock the night before and hit a police officer in the 
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process. The license plate number was distributed to Oslo police, who were 
waiting at the car rental shop. The two were not seasoned Mossad agents and, 
lacking a viable cover story, told the police everything. A subsequent search of 
the suspects apartments lead to the arrest of four more team members that same 
day, two of whom were official members of the Israeli embassy in Norway. Only 
Michael Harrari and the two combatants that shot Bouchiki escaped. 
The six detainees were subsequently tried in Norwegian court and five of 
six sentenced to jail terms in February 1974. The Israeli government denied any 
knowledge of the incident., However, in 1996 Prime Minister Shimon Peres sent 
a lawyer to Oslo to compensate Bouchiki’s family with $400,000 while continuing 
to deny any official responsibility for the murder. 120  Victor Ostrowsky, a former 
Mossad agent, claimed that the attempt to kill Salameh was done with the 
knowledge and even support of the Norwegian secret service, but after the facts 
surfaced about Bouchiki being killed, Harrari ordered his support team member 
Arbel to allow himself to be caught, thus permitting the Caesara combatants to 
escape.121  Ostrowski also claims that a Palestinian fighter captured by Israel a 
few years later would reveal that Salameh purposely set up the Israeli team in 
Lillehammer. Regardless, the operation in Lillehammer was a complete debacle 
for Israel. Upon return to Israel, Harrari and Mossad chief Zvi Zamir attempted to 
turn in their resignation to PM Meir. She refused their resignations, but the 
operation did force Mossad to reevaluate their intelligence collection and analysis 
on the PLO as well as their combatant tactics. Operation Wrath of God ended for 
the Israelis as a result of Lillehammer.  
The Lillehammer events hit the local and international news almost 
immediately. A Lebanese newspaper reported that Salameh was in Stockholm 
during the operation.122  There was a public outcry in Israel demanding the 
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Prime Minister’s and Mossad chief’s resignation. Although there appeared to be 
little real international political fallout, the domestic response gave some 
momentum to PM Meir’s political opposition. She resigned her post as Prime 
Minister  in 1974 after the Agranat Commission published the results of its 
investigation into the causes of the Yom Kippur War. As mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, several historians surmise that Israel’s zealousness 
in pursuing Black September directly contributed to the neglect of more 
traditional military intelligence efforts that would have provided early warning of 
the October 1973 Yom Kippur war.123  124Reinforcing the notion of 
overzealousness in the terrorist hunt, a few weeks after Lillehammer  another 
faulty intelligence report led to Israel mistakenly forcing an airliner headed to 
Baghdad to land in Israel. The IDF believed that PFLP leader George Habash 
and his operations chief Wadi Hadad were among the 81 passengers on the 
aircraft.125 They were wrong once again and the aircraft was released with all 81 
passengers.  
The Palestinians were not finished with their international terror campaign 
and on August 5, 1973 Fatah operatives approached the El Al airlines counter at 
the international airport in Athens and opened fire. The attack killed three 
passengers and wounded 55 others. The attack was organized by break away 
Fatah leader Sabri al-Banna (aka Abu Nidal)and executed by members of PFLP, 
thus precipitating the Israeli effort to capture Dr. Habash on the airliner headed to 
Baghdad on August 10th.126  By mid-1972, Arafat had already decided to cease 
the terror campaign and attempt to establish political credibility. Arafat later 
ordered Fatah to kill al-Banna and Abu Mahmoud, another break away Fatah 
leader.127  Arafat had already begun to internally reorganize the PLO after the 
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exodus from Jordan in September 1970 and hoped to gain greater control of 
militant operations by establishing a Higher Military Council. By 1972, guerilla 
attacks against Israel had dropped to approximately 300 in contrast to 670 the 
year before. Arafat did not intend to cease military actions, rather he sought to 
establish the PLO as the representative state of a people without a nation. The 
terror campaign was undermining the PLO’s political credibility.128  In September 
1973, Egyptian President Anwar Saddat invited Arafat to a meeting and invited 
the PLO to participate in the planned October 6th attack against Israel. Saddat 
and his counterpart in Syria intended to catch Israel off-guard and regain territory 
lost in 1967. The plan was to engage in a limited war, so that Sadat could 
negotiate with Israel from a position of strength. The PLO hoped to benefit from 
the post-war negotiations.129 
J. GOALS 
1. Deterrence 
 While it seems plausible on the surface that the assassination of 
PLO members could act as a deterrent to others, the fact remains that it did not 
work. Most social scientists and intelligence analysts today would similarly 
predict that assassination would usually serve to harden the resolve of terror 
groups. Considering that BSO was originally constructed from the elite members 
of the Rasd commandos commanded by Salah Khalaf contributed to the fearless 
resolve demonstrated by the BSO. While killing all of the members of a small 
closed terror cell, if done rapidly, could result in the actual destruction of the 
group; the Israeli plan did not account for the fact that BSO was really just 
moniker used to establish a veil of plausible deniability for the PLO and its Fatah 
militant arm. Israeli intelligence did not have a good measure of the degree to 
which the PLO had repopulated its ranks after the September 1970 exodus from 
Jordan. While Fatah was severely weakened during the Black September, it was 
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replenished in the months following the move to Lebanon. Fatah was able to 
continue operations under the guise of the BSO name in spite of the Israeli 
attempts to deter BSO actions through the attrition of mid-level leaders and 
members in Europe.   
2. Justice 
 There was little argument domestically or internationally about 
Israel’s right to seek justice for the Munich massacre. In contrast to previous 
efforts to seek justice, such as the case of Adolf Eichmann, Israel chose to forgo 
capture missions followed by public trials. Instead the choice was made to 
combine justice and deterrence through public assassinations of persons 
suspected to be responsible for Munich, at least to some degree, without the 
benefit of public trial. In a vain attempt to stay true to tenants of a popular justice 
system, committee X was formed and acted like a summary court. From the 
justice perspective, the assassinations were extra-judicial killings that would raise 
as much controversy as a drone strike program. Besides the questionable judicial 
process employed to generate the list of eleven names, some of the initial 
persons chosen for summary execution were of questionable culpability 
regarding Munich. Wael Zwaiter, the first target killed, was probably the most 
questionable and on the surface seemed to be targeted only because of his 
familial ties to Arafat. The fact that he was killed in a covert manner and Israel 
denied any involvement, also prevented Israel from making a public post-facto 
justification. Better yet, would have been an appeal to Italy for extradition. Even if 
Israel had some irrefutable evidence linking Zwaiter to Munich, a better plan 
would have been to capture him, with or without Italian approval, and try him in 
court. 
 The Palestinian perspective was that their attacks against Israelis, 
regardless of where they occurred and the means used, were justified. They 
were, after all, at war. During the Munich hostage crisis, the Voice of Palestine 
radio broadcasts transmitted a message from the BSO hostage takers:  
 61
We are neither killers nor bandits, we are persecuted people who 
have no land and no homeland…to give up our lives from the very 
first moment. We will the youth of the Arab nation to search for 
death so that life is given to them, their countries, and their people. 
Each drop of blood spilled from you and from us will be oil to kindle 
this nation with flames of victory and liberation.130 
The fact remained that over a tens of thousands of Palestinians were 
displaced as a result of the 1967 war between Israel and the combined Egyptian, 
Jordanian and Syrian forces. Israel retained significant territory in the Sinai, Gaza 
and South Lebanon, preventing Palestinian refugees from returning to their 
homes. Many remain in refugee camps to this day. The strategic consideration is 
the instant recruiting pool and moral justification for action that a terrorist groups 
gains from a concentrated and greatly impoverished population. The fact that 
Israel also conducted massive airstrikes and armor raids, in the days following 
Munich, into Palestinian camps in Syria and Lebanon, killing innocent woman 
and children, also fueled the animosity.131 
3. Prevention 
 Prevention was the most realistic goal for Israel and also the most 
difficult to measure with respect to success or failure. Initially Israel had little 
intelligence about the newly rebuilt Fatah and appeared to lack an appreciation of 
the depth and capabilities of the PLO’s intelligence organizations and their 
operational reach. Israel had little specific information about the PLO’s tactical 
plans outside of the occupied territories and attempts to penetrate its European 
network were thwarted as evidenced by Baruch Cohen’s murder in Madrid. The 
greatest preventative success was likely Spring of Youth. In a single operation, 
Israel forced the PLO to pause and react to the compromise of vital information 
about its clandestine operations that was found in the Fatah West Bank 
commander Adwan’s apartment.  
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Additionally, Arafat had to replace two high ranking leaders. Ironically, 
Arafat chose to mend relations with Fatah co-founder Salah Khalaf, aka Abu 
Iyad; an act that in of itself would temper the PLO’s overall terror efforts since 
Khalaf was the principle supporter of the radical BSO operations. Arafat would 
eventually convince Khalaf that BSO style tactics were not working with respect 
to advancing international support for the Palestinian cause. In another twist of 
fate, Khalaf was in Beirut the evening of SoY and had asked to stay at Kamal 
Nassir’s apartment that night. Nassir, however, refused his friend because he 
needed to stay up late write a eulogy for another PLO member that had fallen to 
Israeli gunfire. Both Arafat and Ali Hassan Salameh were in Beirut that night 
within 200 yards of the Sayaret commandos.132   
SoY, more than any other mission seemed to encompass successful 
aspects of all of the goals established by PM Meir and committee X. The 
compromise of operational information, coupled with the loss of key leaders 
forced Fatah to change its plans and personnel and represented a preventative 
success.  
Similarly, the fact that known militant commanders were targeted seemed 
a better fit with regard to seeking justice against those responsible for Munich. It 
was closer to justice on the scale of hunting Osama Bin Laden and his inner 
circle after 9/11. Additionally, SoY was the only operation that Israel ever publicly 
acknowledged responsibility for, thus allowing the government to make a public 
appeal and present a moral justification for its actions.133  Lastly, SoY likely had 
the greatest deterrent effect. The public acknowledgement coupled with the 
audacity and effectiveness of the operation, including the absolute minimal loss 
of innocent lives possible for such a bold commando raid, created a public 
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mystique in Beirut  that “the Mossad and the Israelis can reach anyone, 
anywhere, even in their bedrooms.”134   
K. POLITICAL RISK AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
In determining the best means to deter further terror attacks abroad, the 
Israelis also had to consider the costs associated with doing nothing. Certainly 
the Munich massacre was unprovoked from an Israeli perspective and the 
conditions that motivated the BSO to commit acts of terror, the occupation of 
Palestine by Jews, was not something that could be easily amended. The 
challenge facing the Israeli government is well articulated in a letter written by 
one of the Wrath of God team leaders to author George Jonas:   
What will stop it? Not assassination teams or military incursions. In 
my view, terrorism will continue until the political and economic 
situation shifts sufficiently to bring equity and balance throughout all 
of the Middle East. “An eye for an eye” may seem an appropriate 
response, but it is not a solution. Unfortunately, until we find one, 
we must be prepared to deal with continuing terrorist attacks and 
the subsequent acts of revenge that will inevitably follow.135 
From the standpoint of the government, a strong response was a political 
imperative to maintaining control over the irate Israeli population. PM Meir had to 
act as a matter of political survival. All of the sources referenced for this thesis 
also share a common appreciation for PM Meir deep sense of personal and 
sometimes motherly commitment to her people. PM Meir was deeply conflicted 
about Wrath of God and took personal responsibility for authorizing each 
mission.  
Still, assassination was not the only dimension to the Munich response. 
The Israeli intelligence services tried to combine their lethal activities with more 
subtle techniques such as running obituaries in local European papers for junior 
PLO and BSO members who were still living there. Mossad agents would then 
                                            
134 Klein, Striking Back, 169. 
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call the concerned individual and after confirming the target’s identity, begin to 
articulate intimate details about the targets own personal activities and those of 
his family. The phone call would end with the Mossad agent strongly 
recommending that the targeted individual leave the PLO and discontinue any 
association with its activities.136  The effects from the Mossad psychological 
deterrence attempts are difficult to assess, but it is likely that some PLO 
members left the organization for fear of Israeli assassins.   
Regardless of the limited deterrent effects achieved through intimidation, 
Operation Wrath of God failed to deter further terror attacks against Israelis 
abroad. PLO attacks, exercised through the BSO, actually became more focused 
against Israeli government officials and agents in Europe after December 1972. 
In the end, it was Arafat that forced Fatah to abandon the terror campaign. Arafat 
realized that Fatah’s terror actions were gaining international attention for the 
Palestinian cause but not necessarily support.137  Arafat realized the political 
climate had changed and knew that Fatah and the PLO would be better served 
by seeking a political solution. 
 The challenge that PM Meir faced was what to do about the 
increased threat posed by the PLO’s bold new strategy that was backed by 
strong ties to Egypt and the Soviet Union. Airstrikes and police actions in 
Palestinian safe havens in the Middle East had not diminished the threat nor 
deterred others from joining the PLO. Crenshaw’s theories on deterrence if they 
had been applied could have helped PM Meir shape a more effective response 
strategy 
The task of the government is to encourage disintegration without 
provoking the escalation of violence. Denying reward is difficult. 
What the outside world perceives as ‘failure’ may not appear so to 
such an adversary. The organization’s structure of incentives must 
be altered in order to reduce the possibilities of violence. Offering 
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Struggle (Portland, Oregon: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 670. 
 65
new, non-violent incentives, increasing opportunities for exit to non-
violent political methods, or promoting the expression of internal 
dissent are policy options that fit this theoretical interpretation. The 
use of military force is not recommended in the terms of this 
approach, since retaliation may only strengthen loyalty within the 
group. At the least, the results of the use of force will be highly 
unpredictable. Counter-intelligence initiatives combined with judicial 
and political measures are more suitable.138 
It is not clear, however, what political measures the Israelis could have 
offered the Palestinians, short of allowing them to return to their traditional 
claimed homeland in Israel, that would have compelled enough PLO group 
members to leave the organization and cause its disintegration. The fact that the 
PLO received material, funding and training support from several Arab nations 
and the Soviet Union also served to severely hinder any deterrence or 
consolation attempts.  
L. CONCLUSION: 
The post mortem analysis of Operation Wrath of God indicates that the 
Israeli strategic goals were not achieved. In regard to the morale victory through 
enacting revenge, the Israeli’s failed initially in targeting individuals with strong 
and clearly known ties to BSO or PLO military  activities. The Israelis did 
eventually kill the Red Prince, probably the most legitimate target, in 1979. 
Sporadic revenge killings from the Munich incident actually continued into the 
1990s; however, nothing after the Lillehammer incident in 1973 was really 
directly part of the Wrath of God operation. The fact that Israel was violating the 
sovereignty of its European allies in order to conduct these operations also 
seems to have been a misjudgment. Relations with European partners were 
severely strained and the veil of plausible deniability in this case was far too thin 
to provide any cushioning from the diplomatic fallout.  
                                            
138 Martha Crenshaw. “Theories of Terrorism:  Instrumental and Organization Approaches” 
in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), 25.  
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If deterrence was the secondary objective, it also failed miserably. Abu 
Daud, the operational commander of the BSO faction stated years later in an 
interview, “In the Palestinian movement, we have a saying: every crisis has its 
own morals. At that time, a state of war existed between us and the Israelis. They 
were killing us, and we were killing them, except they were killing many times 
more of us than we were killing of them…” 139  The Palestinians supported the 
PLO and BSO actions and the Israeli response to the Munich incident likely had 
the effect of further solidifying popular support for the PLO amongst the Arab 
populations in the middle east. Salah Khalaf would later write “unable to wage 
warfare across Israel’s borders, [Fatah’s young men] insisted on carrying out 
revolutionary violence of another kind, commonly known elsewhere as 
‘terrorism’…”140    
In the same paragraph, Khalaf simply stated that BSO was a means to 
focus the violent feelings toward Israel that pervaded the Palestinian people and 
while they [PLO leadership] knew that the BSO terror attacks would undermine 
the PLO’s political legitimacy, it [BSO] was needed to “channel the wave of 
anger, to structure it and give it a political goal,” thus preventing that anger from 
“taking on an individualistic and anarchic form.”141   Sadly, the Israeli public’s 
temperament after the Munich massacre seemed similar to that of the 
Palestinians described by Khalaf. In the end, domestic unrest combined with a 
real concern for political survival guided the Wrath of God plan.  
A better approach may have been to focus military efforts on precision 
strikes and raids against key PLO figures such as Salameh and Arafat in their 
strongholds in Lebanon. The Israeli government proved its capability to strike into 
the heart of the PLO sanctuary during Operation Spring of Youth (April 1973). 
The operation was a stunning success and drew no negative response from any 
European or western ally. The operation was essentially background noise to the 
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rest of the international community in the ongoing Arab-Israeli struggle. Spring of 
Youth was Israel’s only attempt to conduct targeted killings inside Palestinian 
strongholds in response to Munich. The rest of the operations were conducted by 
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IV. ENDSTATE AND CONSIDERATIONS 
We uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is 
right, but because it strengthens our country and keeps us safe. 
Time and again, our values have been our best national security 
asset – in war and peace, in times of ease, and in eras of upheaval. 
Fidelity to our values is the reason why the United States of 
America grew from a small string of colonies under the writ of an 
empire to the strongest nation in the world.142  
This chapter focuses on the considerations that national decision makers 
face when evaluating the efficacy of a proposed covert or clandestine action. The 
list of considerations could be endless; however this thesis groups the 
consideration into three broad categories:  the national goals, the moral 
consistency, and lastly the political risks. The intent of this chapter is to establish 
an intellectual framework that enables effective analysis of Israel’s actions. The 
chapter establishes that the conceptual endstate conditions that a political leader 
desires should be the first consideration and be reflected clearly in the 
subsequent national goals which will drive covert or clandestine actions. Those 
goals, when supported by an effective strategy, should be accomplished in a 
manner that is consistent with the core values of the society. The clandestine 
nature of the tactics used to achieve the goals should never deviate from the 
moral justification used to justify the national goals. The lesson of history is that 
covert and clandestine actions often become public knowledge and democratic 
leaders will be judged by their own society. Lastly, political risk is inherent in all 
covert or clandestine actions and the outcomes of any operation may have 
unanticipated consequences that although usually politically survivable may still 
be undesirable. The nation’s leaders must apply an evaluative process to 
determine if the actions are achieving the desired effects and adapt the strategy 
as conditions change.  
                                            
142 President Barack Obama, National Archives, May 21, 2009. This quote is also found on 
page 35 of the May 2010 National Security Strategy. 
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A. START AT THE END     
The first consideration should always be the endstate.143  The proposed 
action is after all only a vehicle by which some higher purpose is achieved. In this 
regard, policy makers can look to modern military planners for tools to develop a 
successful covert or clandestine mission profile that will support the nation’s 
goals. In the U.S. military the commander is either given a mission by a higher 
authority or quite often is simply faced with a problem in his immediate operating 
environment that must be addressed. The commander, aided by his staff, 
immediately defines the problem through in-depth analysis and then develops a 
concept of what he wants the environment that his unit is operating in to be after 
the problem is resolved. In military terms this is the commander’s desired 
endsate and it includes the status of the enemy, the friendly forces and the 
environment. The military definition of endstate is primarily applied to tactical 
outcomes, but can still be applied to strategic planning if the political and social 
dimensions are included. The military staff’s job is to then take the problem 
statement and the commander’s desired endstate and develop multiple courses 
of action that would solve the problem, identifying the risks and costs associated 
with each. Essentially, the military starts by defining the problem and then jumps 
to the other end of the timeline and imagines a world were that problem is either 
eliminated or reduced to a manageable level. The process is called, quite plainly, 
“The Military Decision Making Process” or MDMP.144   
                                            
143 “Endstate” is derived from multiple U.S. military doctrinal manuals. See U.S. Army Field 
Manual 5–0  and 6–0. The following excerpt from FM 5–0 (2005 edition) explains endstate as a 
part of the commander’s visualization process that drives staff planning:   
1–34. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of achieving a clear understanding of 
the force’s current state with relation to the enemy and environment (situational understanding), 
and developing a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks 
that move the force from its current state to the end state (commander’s intent) (FM 6–0). 
Commander’s visualization (see Figure 1–2) is a way of mentally viewing the dynamic 
relationship among Army forces, enemy forces, and the environment at the present while 
conducting operations against an opposing force over time. 
144 Definition of MDMP derived from U.S. Army Field Manual FM 5–0  (2010 edition), 3–1:   
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The case studies selected for this thesis show both positive and negative 
examples of effective decision making processes where leaders were faced with 
a problem, visualized a desired endstate, and then implemented a plan that 
would achieve it with acceptable costs and risks. In the case of Adolf Eichmann, 
the problem was one of Israel’s moral obligations to seek justice and contribute 
to a sense of closure for an entire nation that could be found bringing one of the 
most notorious Nazis to justice. There was no national security interest at stake 
with regard to Eichmann, but there was a moral imperative to act. In envisioning 
the endstate, PM Ben-Gurion and Isser Harel both recognized that merely killing 
Eichmann, while it may satisfy a personal sense of revenge for those involved in 
the mission or those affected by the holocaust, would never achieve the higher 
moral purpose. The true national goal was a public justice based on the 
precedent established during the Nuremburg trials after World War II. Any covert 
action that resulted in Eichmann’s death, while it probably would not have 
incurred any greater political risk, would have undermined the national objective 
and clearly not supported the Prime Minister’s desired endstate. Additionally, the 
endstate envisioned by PM Ben-Gurion was well conceived with regard to 
compliance with his own people’s cultural values. Public support for the trial was 
overwhelming and at the same time little domestic scrutiny was applied to the 
veracity of the government’s official cover story regarding Eichmann’s 
apprehension. While it is clear that Ben-Gurion and his staff underestimated the 
depth of pro-fascist influences in Argentine politics, the domestic social and 
political gains inside Israel, resulting from Eichmann’s trial, far outweighed the 
political risks of broken Argentine-Israeli relations.  
In the Wrath of God vignette, the endstate was less clear. The mixing of 
deterrence along with an Old Testament based “eye for an eye” style of justice 
                                                                                                                                  
3–1. The military decision making process is a planning model that establishes procedures 
for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria 
of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or 
order. The MDMP applies across the spectrum of conflict and range of military operations. 
Commanders with an assigned staff use the MDMP to organize their planning activities, share a 
common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and 
orders. 
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seems misplaced. There was no evidence to support the notion that symbolic 
killings of PLO middle men in Europe would achieve any deterrent effect. In fact, 
the similar assassinations carried out years earlier by Unit 101 demonstrated that 
the Palestinians were likely to increase their use of terror attacks in response. A 
revenge based justice did resonate with a large segment of the population, but it 
had no deterrent effect.  
Many political theorists and intelligence analysts today would agree that 
assassination usually serves to harden the resolve of terror organizations, 
especially ones with significant popular support, such as the PLO. Max Abrahm’s 
study of terrorist motivations supported the notion of social solidarity with 
similarly affected people as a prime motivation for group cohesion.145 Abrahm’s 
theory seems to fit well with stateless Palestinian diaspora living in refugee 
camps. The death of Palestinians at the hands of Israelis was also common 
place. Eleven more names added to the obituaries seemed inconsequential 
when hundreds were dying annually on each side. Similarly, Jenna Jordan’s 
study indicates that leadership decapitation can result in the dissolution of some 
terror groups, but only if the group is young and small in size.146  Jordan further 
notes that in her study of 298 groups, the older and larger groups actually 
became more cohesive if their leaders had been targeted.147   
The PLO, was new in name only, and the force that Israel was fighting in a 
strategic context was the militant arm of Palestinian et large supported by several 
Arab nations. There is an argument that if enough PLO operatives and planners 
were killed, they simply would not have enough infrastructure to function. 
Jordan’s research supports that the most effect use of targeted killings is based 
on modern Social Network Theory analysis where individuals who maintain key 
                                            
145 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorist Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism 
Strategy,” International Security, 32, no.4 (Spring 2008), 79.  
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relationship roles in the organization are targeted.148  If BSO where an isolated 
organization and not a guise used by Fatah and PFLP, killing key individuals in 
BSO may have worked; however even the value of several of the targets 
selected with respect to Wrath of God is questionable. Israeli leaders knew that 
King Husayn had severely diminished the PLO’s militant strength in 1970. Israeli 
leaders were not, however, aware that the PLO had rebuilt their fighting forces by 
1972 and with several hundred-thousand disenfranchised Palestinian refugees 
still in camps, the PLO had a practically limitless supply of recruits. The PLO had 
also demonstrated its ability to turn tactical losses into propaganda gains 
amongst its constituents. Israeli violence against the PLO bolstered PLO 
recruiting and in most cases, emboldened the different PLO militant factions, who 
were already competing amongst each other for primacy in the militant struggle 
against Israel.149  
The prevention goal, tied to killing key operational members of the PLO 
such as the Red Prince was a far better goal, especially if the desired endstate 
was a world where PLO was not able to plan and execute effective terror attacks. 
It seemed that effective prevention was sidetracked during Wrath of God, or at 
least subjugated below the symbolic killings in Rome, Paris, and elsewhere. The 
initial targets were of questionable relevance to ongoing terror plots, but Israel 
was focused on sending a message to the PLO. The message Israel thought 
they were sending was one of deterrence. In fact, the message had the opposite 
effect and the violence escalated.  
Spring of Youth, ironically, was effective in sending a message of 
deterrence to the Palestinian youth in Lebanon while also creating a severe 
disruptive effect to the PLO’s current portfolio of clandestine militant operations.. 
The problem with prevention is that it is very difficult to measure success unless 
one knows of a specific impending attack. The documents seized during the 
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Spring of Youth raid gave Israel a glimpse of the PLO’s plans. No other Wrath of 
God operation even attempted to collect intelligence information about PLO 
activities or intentions.  
In the end, Israel’s lack of clear goals lead to the implementation of covert 
action campaign that became the goal in of itself instead of part to a larger 
strategy. Simply killing people on the list became the goal and the strategic 
effects of those missions in the context of overall Israeli security was not 
considered. The singular focus on the mission, instead of the strategic endstate, 
also distracted Israel from watching its Arab neighbors and resulted in the 
surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on October 6th, 1973. Had Israel been 
focused on achieving an endstate with their covert assassination campaign, they 
would have realized early that killing low level PLO functionaries was not 
preventing terror attacks. Israel would then have been in position to either 
abandon the effort or refocus its intelligence assets in the occupied territories and 
along its own borders in an effort to target PLO leaders and key facilitators 
actively engaged in attacks planning against the Israeli population. The 
geographic refocus of intelligence assets alone would have reduced the 
likelihood that Egypt and Syria would be able to build up forces along Israel’s 
borders without being noticed. Additionally, Israel never considered a 
collaborative approach to neutralizing PLO attacks in Europe. Israeli intelligence 
of PLFP and Fatah operations and personnel could have been helpful to Greece, 
Italy and other nations that fell prey to aircraft hijackings and other attacks. 
Israel’s unilateral approach to counterterrorism operations excluded the 
possibilities of teaming with host nations to increase resources and support for 
counterterrorism based on mutual goals of security and public safety. 
Israel’s singular focus on the task of checking names off of a “kill list” 
blinded her leaders from establishing mission termination criteria that accounted 
for the possibility that the covert actions might not work in achieving the 
combined desired goals of deterrence, justice and prevention. A strategic 
analysis that defined a clear endstate, determined viable ways to achieve it, and 
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used all means possible (not just covert killings) could have achieved far better 
results and potentially prevented Israel from being too distracted to notice the 
Egyptian and Syrian troop movements along their borders in the days prior to the 
Yom Kippur War. In a 2009 article in the Joint Forces Quarterly, Derek Reveron 
and James Cook offer a simple “Ends, Ways and Means” framework for strategic 
planners150  
Had Israel picked only one goal (end), let’s say prevention, the same 
strategic analysis could have allowed a better strategy to be developed that 
would have targeted the PLO’s militant leaders and key nodes based on social 
network analysis. Targeting with appropriate methods (ways) and resources 
(means) would have minimized the potential of the entire Israeli security 
establishment becoming blinded to the larger movements of Egyptian and Syrian 
forces along Israel’s borders in the weeks before the surprise attack on Yom 
Kippur. 
B. ETHICS OF COVERT ACTIONS 
A national decision maker’s job, especially in a democracy, is to represent 
the will of the people and implement policy that reflects the nation’s values. 
Leaders may be tempted to view covert actions as a means to avoid criticism and 
bearing the accountability for decision, but as former Senate Intelligence 
committee advisor Gregory Treverton points out, most covert actions are 
eventually discovered and using them [covert actions] as a way to avoid making 
a more difficult, yet morally defensible choice, is inherently flawed.151  Treverton 
goes on to point out that government leaders seem to ignore historical lessons 
about covert actions:   
                                            
150 An excellent description of “Ends, Ways, Means” analysis applied to national security 
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151 Gregory F. Treverton, “The Ethics of Covert Intervention,” International Journal, 43, no.2 
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What is striking about that history of American covert action is the 
repeated presumption of decision-makers that the operations would 
remain secret. That made it tempting to ignore longer-term costs 
and to evade ethical questions. The costs, and the dilemmas, even 
if they are recognized, might never have to be borne or resolved. 
Yet history teaches that they probably will be borne. In all 
likelihood, the operation will become known, and America will be 
judged for having undertaken it. So the record shows. ..152 
Treverton’s essay about ethics focused on larger covert interventions such 
as Angola in 1975 and the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980s. The lessons about not 
using covert or clandestine means to side step ethical and moral considerations 
is still equally applicable to the smaller more decisive covert actions discussed in 
this thesis. 
Regardless of what moral theory a person subscribes to, the applied 
ethics used to justify an action must be consistent with the nation’s core values. 
Anything less than a consistent and sound moral argument will open the door to 
political attack and social criticism. The long term impacts of improper normative 
assessment may include damage to the government’s credibility amongst the 
domestic population as well as the international community. Eroded credibility 
equates to diminished trust between the government and its stake holders and 
ultimately reduces the government’s effectiveness. The effect of such internal 
strife may result in a loss of confidence in the government by the people and will 
be reflected in election results. 
Moral consistency applies equally to:  1) matching a national policy goal to 
the nation’s values and 2) applying moral guidelines throughout the process used 
to achieve those goals, whether that process is overt, covert or mixture of 
methods. This first statement is a denouncement of ‘the ends justify the means’ 
approach to justifying covert action. The recommended approach to defensible 
moral calculus for covert actions should likely be viewed as a moral realist stance 
in general, though the metaethics to the approach are not crucial and perhaps a 
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consistent moral relativism could be accomodated. More relevant, however, is 
that the recommended approach excludes a purely consequentialist viewpoint 
where the outcome of the covert action determines whether it was morally right 
or wrong. The moral relativist would say that one’s own social and culture context 
determines morality.  
This viewpoint would support a nation looking after its own interests while 
at the same time subscribing to an internally relevant moral code. A moral realist 
approach, of course, would contend that the moral code in question should be 
applied universally, beyond merely the scope of the given state.. The 
consequentialist would certainly affirm that the ends always justify the means, no 
matter how brutal or distasteful the means may be. This view seems short 
sighted and does not account for the fact those most citizens live by some moral 
code and similarly expect their government to apply morality in governance as 
well.  
The most difficult problem for consequentialism in this case is the fact that, 
by definition, an action that failed to achieve the desired effect would be deemed 
immoral. A government would simply never take the risk of covert actions, unless 
it were almost negligible, since any compromise of the government sponsorship 
for an action would be a failure and therefore morally wrong. The secrecy 
afforded a covert action or clandestine mission should not create an exception to 
the rule of morally consistent policy. For the sake of this thesis the term ‘moral 
consistency’ best suits the analysis. Moreover, a non-consequentialist normative 
approach to such moral grounding would best fit with the recommendation 
presented in this thesis. 
During Wrath of God, the policy goals established by Golda Meir were 
muddled and promoted a method that favored symbolic violence that looked 
more like terrorism rather than a well-articulated and morally consistent systemic 
approach to achieving a clear endstate. PM Meir was emotionally compromised 
by her own biases regarding Jews killed on German soil reminiscent of holocaust 
days. The similarly emotional public sentiment that openly called for “personal 
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terrorism” to combat the growing Palestinian threat reinforced PM Meir’s position. 
Further codifying the popular appeal of a fight fire with fire strategy was the 
popularity of The Book of the Paratroopers published in 1969 with some 
sponsorship of the IDF Parachute Brigade. The book chronicles the terror 
reprisal attacks conducted by Unit 101 where entire Arab tribes were targeted in 
response to terror attacks. The book praised Unit 101’s actions as ‘heroic’ while 
at the same time describing the slaughter of entire groups of Arabs, including 
civilians, in great detail.153  That fact that terror attacks against Israelis increased 
steadily during Unit 101’s four years of ‘an eye for an eye’ operations seemed to 
go unnoticed amongst the Israeli public and her leaders alike. The public and the 
political leadership in Israel were caught up in a swelling emotional tidal wave 
after the Munich massacre, thus inhibiting the clear thinking required to establish 
morally defensible goals supported by a consistent strategy.  
Wrath of God needed a specific and consistent framework for the both the 
moral and legal justification; either a military or a judicial basis for action. The 
justice goal established by PM Meir required a judicial approach. Subsequently, 
in order to achieve justice, Israel would have been obligated to apprehend those 
suspected to be responsible for the Munich massacre. After an arrest, the 
suspects should have been tried in an Israeli court and sentenced in accordance 
with the verdict and Israeli law. The Israeli people were denied public justice, the 
accused were denied the right to face their accusers and prove their innocence. 
Even a more simplistic “Eye for an Eye” biblical approach to justice would have 
demanded that Israel prove beyond doubt the complicitness of each target on the 
kill list with the Munich massacre before the operation was conducted. The 
secrecy of committee X’s selection process made it difficult for the Israeli 
government to justify its actions by satisfying the burden of proof. A traditional 
Just War Theory approach to countering the PLO under the terms of a ‘Just War’ 
would have provided Israel with a moral framework to approach the problem of 
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PLO terrorism.154  Whether the primary goal was justice or prevention, a Just 
War Theory approach would have provided a justification for killing PLO terrorists 
provided that Israel could prove those targeted were either planning an eminent 
attack or were directly responsible for one. According to Just War theory, Israel’s 
obligation was also to seek other means of administering justice and resorting to 
targeted killing only as a last resort.155  The Just War framework also had the 
benefit of being the basis for international armed conflict laws codified after World 
War II in the Geneva Convention. If applied correctly, the Just War approach 
would have lead Israel to a course of action with greater international legitimacy 
and moral consistency. 
Operation Eichmann provided an example of a goal of justice supported 
by a clandestine operation to apprehend the suspect and then try him in a court 
of law. The Eichmann apprehension was conducted as a clandestine mission in 
lieu of a political request for extradition for pragmatic reasons and based on 
recent precedent established by Germany’s failed attempt to extradite Dr. 
Mengele. While the circumstances of Eichmann’s arrest were an area of 
contention between Israel and Argentina, the fact the Eichmann was a wanted 
criminal implicated with crimes against humanity was clear. If Israeli leaders 
believed there was a reasonable chance that the Argentinians would have 
arrested and extradited Eichmann, the chances are that Ben-Gurion would have 
engaged them politically. There was a moral justification for trying Eichmann and 
Israel’s choice to apprehend him, in light of the pro-Nazi sympathies in Argentina, 
was warranted. Had Israel simply assassinated him, denying him the right to a 
trial, then the action would have been both unjust and morally inconsistent with 
the goal and the nation’s values as a free democratic society. 
                                            
154 For an overview of Just War Theory see Brian Orend’s article titled “War”:   
Brian Orend, “War,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008). accessed on 5 
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The singular merit of Wrath of God, which should have been the 
framework for the entire operation, was the moral justification for prevention as 
demonstrated by Operation Spring of Youth. The goals in regard to Spring of 
Youth were preventive in nature regarding the PLO’s comprehensive militant 
activities and active threat of unjust harm. Hence, the primary moral justification 
for the operation was in alignment with the classic justification basis of ‘Just War’. 
For this reason, two key military commanders were targeted. The PLO 
spokesman was targeted because of his role in fulfilling the propaganda mandate 
of the PLO’s terrorism campaigns. In military terms, the PLO spokesman was 
conducting information operations, a critical component to political violence. The 
moral justification for targeting specific PLO officials under a Just War framework 
was sound. The Israeli government also ensured that proportionality and minimal 
collateral damage was inflicted during the operation. The decision to send their 
most elite unit on a discreet raid with a clandestine infiltration after weeks of 
rehearsals minimized the chances of an unanticipated gun battle in the streets of 
Beirut that would have resulted in civilian casualties. The result of the operation 
was that minimal lives were lost on both sides and Israel still achieved both its 
tactical objectives and strategic goal of prevention.  
In contrast to Spring of Youth, the Lillehammer mission represented a 
moral failing in the consistent application of appropriate methods to achieve the 
military goal. From prevention perspective, the intended target at Lillehammer 
(the Red Prince) was a valid military target and would have been consistent with 
a Just War framework.156 Israel failed to apply moral consistentency during the 
mission by hastily assembling a team that lacked the experience, expertise and 
skills required to conduct such a sensitive operation. In a critical failure of 
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judgement, likely excasterbated by the excitement associated with such a rare 
opportunity to kill a high priority target, Michael Harrari took for granted that his 
surveillance team lacked the experience needed to assess the target and 
determine if it really was Salameh. The fact that the suspect had ridden a bicycle 
from the café back to a quiet residential neighborhood earlier in the day did not fit 
the profile of Salameh, the chosen successor of Yassir Arafat and a well-known 
for his expensive tastes and playboy lifestyle.  
Similarly, when the suspect was seen leaving a movie theater with a 
pregnant woman and then the two boarded a public bus together should have 
caused the entire surveillance team to pause and reconsider. Harrari, as the 
head of the famed Mossad Caesara unit was fully aware that his team selection 
and overall mission support were rushed and generally less than adequate for 
such a sensitive mission. While tactical objective and strategic goals had a 
defensible moral justification, the mission execution was sloppy, unprofessional 
and exuded overconfidence. Israel’s moral obligation, in light of the fact that they 
intended to violate a neutral nations sovereignty to kill another human being, was 
to undertake the covert mission with gravity, seriousness and the highest level of 
effort possible to ensure success and negate the chance for collateral damage. 
Israel’s last moral failing during operation Lillehammer was with respect to their 
own Mossad agents, all of whom were left in Norway to stand trial and serve 
subsequent prison sentences. Even if there was a moral justification for 
abandoning patriotic citizens committed to a life of high risk service to their 
country, the fact that Israel’s de facto policy was to regard any compromised 
agent as ‘expendable’ was probably quite destructive to agency moral and 
recruiting potential.  
C. POLITICAL RISKS AND THE AUDIENCE   
It almost goes without saying that foreign policy is often driven by 
domestic opinion in a democratic state. The essence of audience costs is that 
public opinion forces leaders to commit to higher levels of violence in a conflict in 
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fear of looking weak in front of their domestic constituency. Audience costs 
represent a true political risk that cannot be denied. However, leaders must 
ensure that the fear of losing public support or even the next election does not 
drive an ineffective strategy.  
Operation Wrath of God certainly had elements of audience costs that 
created a real political risk for PM Meir and her government. The fact is that 
public opinion varied, but for the most part, rested on the side of extreme 
measures or fighting fire with fire. One article in the Haaretz newspaper from 
September 8th stated “The only method to be adopted against these killers is 
that adoped by King Hussein, who knew them at close quarters – they must be 
annihilated and hunted doewn to the bitter end.”157  The same paper published 
bold statements a few days later espousing the adoption of terror tactics 
reminiscent of the tactics used against Arab commando leaders in the 1956 War 
to combat the Arab terrorists of the PLO:  Personal terrorism outside the area will 
not solve everything, any more than raids by the Air Force on the saboteurs’ 
bases in the Arab countries will solve everything. But if we do not adopt the 
method of personal terrorism against the leaders of the terrorists and killers we 
shall be deliberately throwing away our own weapons.”158  Reinforcing the media 
hype over a hardline response was the fact that several former members of the 
Haganah had already been arrested for transporting weapons to support 
independent attacks against the PLO. With the pressure mounting in the media, it 
appears that PM Meir and her staff became focused on the targeted killings as 
symbolic acts of retribution that would help to satisfy some of her critics in the 
Israeli population. The biblical approach of an “eye for eye” had long been a 
Jewish tactic against their Arab neighbors dating back to the Yishuv council and 
the Haganah days and the notion still had overwhelming support amongst the 
Israeli populace. 
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The other audience to consider with respect to covert or clandestine 
missions is the audience in the affected territory. In the Eichmann case, PM Ben-
Gurion demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the strong fascist sentiment in 
Argentina, especially amongst the dominant Catholic constituency and the 
Foreign ministry. PM Ben-Gurion decided not to include his Argentinian 
ambassador in the mission planning, a mistake that likely resulted in Israel 
concocting a feeble cover story about independent Israeli citizens tracking down 
Eichmann and asking him nicely to travel back to Israel for trial, which he of 
course agreed to. PM Ben-Gurion underestimated the public outcry amongst 
fascists in Argentina and the Argentine President’s need to demonstrate some 
act of reprisal against Israel in order to pacify constituents and neutralize political 
enemies. Had Ben-Gurion included his Argentine experts in the planning, Israel 
may have contrived a more palatable cover story and thereby posed less of a 
threat to the Argentine President’s political control and legitimacy. 
D. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS   
The moral considerations for covert HVI missions build the basis for a 
viable legal framework for such missions, particularly under the nation’s right to 
self-defense in accordance with Just War theory and the Geneva conventions. 
While this thesis is not intended to be a debate on the internationally legality of 
HVI kill/capture missions, a nation undertaking such operations must considerthe 
international context of their operations. The mission to capture Adolf Eichmann 
was clearly in violation of Argentina’s sovereignty; however, the fact that a legal 
precedent was established as a result of the Nuremburg trials for prosecution of 
Nazi war criminals gave Israel a defensible position with regard to continuing with 
Eichmann’s trial and punishment instead of returning him to Argentina. 
International law is, however, constantly debated and typically is not a driving 
consideration with regard to covert or clandestine actions.  
Although international law is not a primary concern with respect to covert 
action, establishing a sound legal basis for the action remains a prudent measure 
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in preparing responses to criticism in the international arena. The legal 
complexities are significant today and were likely similar to what Israel 
encountered in combatting the PLO. Both the U.S. and Israel chose not to sign 
Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention IV, Article 3, thus denying acceptance of 
the provision that non-state groups have the right to fight against them.159  Lisa 
Hajjar’s essay on Israel and America’s choice to similarly follow alternative 
interpretations of International Humanitarian Law in order to establish internal 
legal precedent in support of their respective wars on terror is testament to the 
fact that international law is not a primary concern with respect to covert actions.  
Hajjar goes on to state that Israel’s selective interpretation of the IHL 
provisions of the Geneva Convention have “been invoked to justify brutal 
interrogations, extrajudicial executions, and collective punishments for 
deterrence, reprisal, intelligence gathering, and prosecution.”160  After 
September 11, 2001 the U.S. congress conferred the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force to the executive branch enabling the U.S. military to kill or capture 
terrorists without a formal declaration of war and under the direction of the 
President. In November 2001, President Bush declared Al Qaida detainees to be 
“unlawful combatants” and therefore exempt from IHL prisoner of war status.161  
Both decisions reflected the necessity for America to react to the Al Qaida threat 
and the fact that current international and domestic laws did not offer clear 
guidance on how to address a stateless enemy such as Al Qaida.  
In Israel’s fight against PLO terror and the American fight against Al 
Qaida, the important legal consideration is really internalregarding the processes 
of government and internal legal oversight. A nation conducting lethal covert or 
clandestine missions should ensure that the same scrutiny applied to establish 
moral consistency is applied from a legal perspective. As noted by policy makers 
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in the U.S. National Counterterrorism Strategy, counterterror operations 
immediately after September 11, 2001 were conducted “in an environment of 
legal uncertainty in which long-established legal rules were applied to 
circumstances not seen before in this country.”162   The focus of the legal 
aspects of the U.S. strategy is not to convince the world that the U.S. position is 
correct, but to establish a sound argument on “a solid legal footing” within a legal 
framework that is “both effective and durable.”163  The same document 
establishes the legal goals of the framework are the ability to “withstand legal 
challenge, survive scrutiny and earn the support of Congress and the American 
people as well as our partners and allies.”164  The U.S. policy has not 
sidestepped the issues of legality, but pragmatically noted that they are difficult 
and the most important aspect is soundness of a legal argument that has 
domestic political backing.  
Leaders owe their subordinates the due diligence to ensure that the 
missions they undertake are both legal and ethical according to domestic law and 
social values. Israel was operating in new terrain both conceptually and 
physically with regard to covert actions in Europe against the PLO. There was no 
legal review process in place to provide oversight to government sponsored 
missions. PM Meir and General Yahriv established committee X as an ad hoc 
body to provide both direction and oversight of the missions. The committee was 
self-regulating. The lack of true impartial legal oversight was itself a risk for PM 
Meir. There is no evidence to suggest that Wrath of God was illegal according to 
Israeli law; however there was also no official policy or legal ruling establishing 
the actions as specifically legal. The missions were legally ambiguous and 
therefore executed with the full risk assumed by PM Meir and the executive 
branch. After the debacle at Lillehammer and the surprise attack by Arab 
                                            




neighbors on Yom Kippur in 1973, PM Meir’s Labor party lost supporters to the 
new conservative Likud party and PM Meir stepped down. 
Recognizing the imperfect nature of the legal structures of the day, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote several letters both defending his actions in assuming 
authorities outside of his constitutional mandate and at the same time, cautioning 
against the practice: 
The question you propose, whether circumstances do not 
sometimes occur, which make it a duty in officers of high trust, to 
assume authorities beyond the law, is easy of solution in principle, 
but sometimes embarrassing in practice. A strict observance of the 
written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, 
but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, 
of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To 
lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would 
be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who 
are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the 
means165 
The quote from Jefferson is in reference to his unilateral decision to 
commit the nation to the Louisiana Purchase without the prior approval from 
Congress and furthermore without even tacit statutory authority from the 
constitution. Jefferson cited several examples of military action under extreme 
circumstances as examples  of scenarios that warranted discretion and 
adherence to moral values over strict legal interpretation. Jefferson, an astute 
legal scholar and strict constructionalist, fully realized that the documents crafted 
less than 20 years prior and intended to guide nation’s leaders, were not written 
in anticipation of the entire spectrum of possible scenarios that the nation’s 
leaders may face. That level of forsight was simply impossible.  
The lesson from Jefferson is that eventually leaders will face challenges 
that are unprecedented and legal constructs will not neatly provide guidance for 
action. In those cases, leaders should be guided by the values of the nation and 
their own sound judgement with the nation’s best interests in mind. Jefferson also 
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astutely noted that leaders can still suffer dire political consequences even with 
the best of intentions in mind, but that risk is outweighed by the leader’s 
obligation to do what is best for the nation at all times.  
Political risk and the moral and legal considerations are tightly woven 
together, particularly in the realm of covert and clandestine actions to kill or 
capture high-value targets. Jefferson’s guidance applies equally to Israeli leaders 
in the 1960s and 70s as well as to U.S. leaders today. Decisions to act must be 
guided by a hierarchy of considerations, foremost being the overall welfare of the 
nation. The nation’s welfare is based on preservation of moral values equally as 
it based on protection from physical threats. National security and values are 
inseperable: 
We are committed to upholding our most cherished values as a 
nation not just because doing so is right but also because doing so 
enhances our security. Adherence to those core values – 
respecting human rights, fostering good governance, respecting 
privacy and civil liberties, committing to security and transparency, 
and upholding the rule of law – enables us to build broad 
international coalitions to act against the common threat posed by 
our adversaries while further delegitimizing, isolating, and 
weakening their efforts.166 
The implications of the U.S. CT strategy above are far reaching with 
respect to the appropriate ways and means by which the CT strategy is 
implemented. That said, if the strategy has a clear endstate supported by a well-
articulated strategy that encompasses all elements of national power 
implemented by dedicated and courageous citizens, then the author believes 
success is inevitable.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 This thesis is intended to be prescriptive in nature. The value of 
Israel’s historic High Value Individual (HVI) operations for American leaders are 
in regard to: 1) general political and ideological similarities between the United 
States and Israel, 2) the environmental circumstances that warrant the use of the 
nation’s covert and clandestine capabilities, and lastly 3) the universality and 
timelessness of strategic planning. While there are many differences between the 
U.S. and Israel, the key similarities that are relevant to covert and clandestine 
activities are the common democratic social and political foundations and the will 
to use military and intelligence assets to conduct HVI operations. The 
environmental conditions that drove Israeli leaders to consider covert HVI 
operations, namely PLO terrorists operating in friendly third countries, are similar 
to today’s environment of transnational terrorism dominated by Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates. The strategic planning fundamentals to address PLO threats of the 
1970s and the threats posed by the Al Qaeda franchise today are similar. Those 
strategic plans may find covert and clandestine HVI operations to be integral 
ways of accomplishing the strategic goals. The goals may also be better 
accomplished at times by other ways and means or more often than not, a 
blended approach that employs the full spectrum of national capabilities. In any 
case, covert and clandestine efforts come with risks and should be used only 
when deemed effective, ethical and prudent.  
The following steps are recommended as a general policy planning 
framework to ensure that covert or clandestine actions properly support national 
goals and are nested in a comprehensive strategy:  
1. Define the Problem  
While this may sound like a simple step, a proper analysis of the problem 
is critical to developing realistic goals and sound strategy. Most important to 
defining the problem is gathering as much information as possible. In the 
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Eichmann case, the information gathering effort focused on confirming Eichmann 
was alive and then where he was. It took years for Israel to confirm that 
Eichmann was living in Argentina. After confirming Eichmann’s location, Israel 
should have gathered more information about the political and social 
environment in Argentina in order to understand the strategic context that would 
drive post-operations responses. In regards to Wrath of God, Israel was caught 
by surprise during the Munich massacre. Israel had very little information about 
the true nature, size and capability of the PLO terror network. Wrath of God was 
conceived and implemented only a few weeks after Munich. The Wrath of God 
plan was rushed and based on limited information. The plan reflected the fact 
that Israeli leaders clearly underestimated the scope of the PLO’s secret militant 
and intelligence network.  
Besides gathering information on hostile actors, Israel should have 
analyzed the root causes for the PLO actions, which were based in the 
disenfranchised Palestinian population. Had Israel truly assessed the root causes 
for Palestinian violence, other strategic efforts may have been developed that 
could have reduced the base motivation for Palestinian anger towards Israel. 
Certainly the sickness and food shortages inside the refugee camps were at least 
contributory to the overall anti-Israeli Palestinian mindset. The large Palestinian 
refugee population provided the PLO with a practically limitless supply of recruits. 
While targeted killings may still have been part of a comprehensive strategy to 
eliminate terror attacks against Israelis, the Israeli government would have been 
better served by offering political and economic solutions to the PLO that would 
have improved the living conditions for average Palestinians and provided a 
political voice to the PLO. Postulating on the possible ‘whole of government’ 
approaches that Israel could have taken is a thesis of its own and beyond the 
scope of this effort; however it is worth noting that there are no indications that 
Israeli leaders ever considered anything beyond an offensive military strategy to 
address Palestinian violence. The Israeli approach to a complex problem with 
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clear socio-economic dimensions was self-limited and exceptionally narrow in its 
scope.  
2. Establish a Clear Endstate  
Probably the most critical step in regard to developing a strategy and 
supporting tactical plans is the endstate. The endstate must take into account the 
environment, both domestic and international. From the endstate, specific goals 
can be derived and used as benchmarks during implementation of a subsequent 
strategy. In the Eichmann scenario the endstate was based on justice being 
served for the benefit of the holocaust survivors and the Israeli people as whole. 
Killing Eichmann, while justifiable to many, would have undermined public justice 
based on Israel’s democratic roots and the precedent set by the Nuremburg 
trials. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion envisioned an endstate where the older 
generation of holocaust survivors would feel redeemed by a trial reminiscent of 
Nuremburg. At the same time, he saw the Eichmann trial as shaping the identity 
of Israel as a just nation for the benefit of the first generation of Israelis born after 
1948. The endstate was clear; apprehend Eichmann and put him on trial, while 
minimizing the negative impacts on Israeli-Argentina relations.  
After Munich, PM Meir defined an endstate where Israelis were safe from 
terrorism but she also directed that biblically consistent “eye for an eye” justice 
be conducted against persons responsible for Munich. In her endstate, PM Meir 
also directed a tactical plan of targeted killings. The plan became the endstate for 
those conducting it and success was measured merely as a consequence of 
whether the targets were killed or not. Israeli leaders failed to define endstate 
conditions that planners could have then used to establish goals and a 
supporting strategy. The author attributes Israel’s muddled endstate and 
subsequent contrary goals to an emotionally compromised small group of Israeli 
leaders centered on PM Meir. Had Israeli leaders approached the Palestinian 
problem more holistically and with a balanced perspective that accounted for root 
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causes behind Palestinian aggression toward Israel, a better endstate might 
have been visualized.  
3. Develop a Strategy  
 A strategy is driven by the endstate and requires clearly defined goals. 
Once the endstate is clear and goals in place, the planners should consider a 
strategy that encompasses all of the instruments of national power to achieve 
those goals. Today we use the DIME model:  Dimplomatic, Information, Military, 
Economic to characterize the instruments of national power. Israeli strategies 
selected for this thesis neglected diplomatic or economic elements. Could Israel 
have offered Argentina economic incentives to arrest and extradite Eichmann? 
Certainly Argentina was motivated by economic growth when allowing Nazis to 
emigrate after WWII. German engineering and scientific knowledge was critical to 
Argentina’s industrial, military and energy growth during the 1950s. Could Israel 
have offered the PLO a political roadmap to statehood in order to stop guerilla 
attacks?   
By 1968, Yassir Arafat had risen to the top position in the Palestine 
National Council and by 1972 was aggressively working to consolidate his control 
over the fractured Palestinian groups represented by the PLO. Had Israel offered 
to guarantee Arafat’s role as Palestinian ‘President’ in a new Palestinian state, a 
more effective ‘carrot and stick’ strategy might have worked to ensure Israeli 
safety and eliminate the Palestinian refugees’ most basis motivation for joining 
the militant struggle against Israel. From an overarching strategy, specific plans 
can be developed that achieve all or part of specified goals. Those plans 
represent the operational efforts and tactical actions that support a strategy. 
Killing Wael Zwaiter was a tactical action that, when viewed as a singular event, 
was neither supportive of nor detrimental to achieving Israel’s goals. The PLO 
was able to use Zwaiter’s death as a propaganda tool to increase support 
amongst Palestinians for militant attacks against Israel. Israel’s tactical action 
became the PLO’s strategic success. A good strategy includes tactical plans and 
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actions and beyond. A strategy includes information campaigns and looks at the 
possible results of any specific actions in context of the overall environment and 
whether the action is likely to bring the actor closer to achieving his endstate or 
not. Leaders must ensure that a tactic, such as targeted killings or drone strikes, 
does not become a default strategy. Key in the strategy is ensuring that the 
nation’s core values are preserved throughout. No arm of national power should 
be tasked to act, whether overtly or in secret, in a manner that is not consistent 
with national values.  
As previously noted in the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 
preserving national values is not only consistent with our efforts to secure the 
nation, it is a source of strength; the two ideals are, from an American 
perspective, inseparable. Ideally, all actions taken should be expressly legal as 
well under domestic law to protect the actors and fortify the sound defense of 
those actions should they become a matter of public controversy. Due to the 
complexity of international law and varying opinions, it may not be reasonable to 
expect broad-based international support for every effort undertaken to pursue 
national interests. Domestic support is, however, an important factor and 
compliance with domestic law is an important step to maintaining internal 
support. As the National CT strategy noted, a measure of legal ambiguity existed 
regarding the U.S. responses to the September 2011 terror attacks. While 
considerable headway has been made to establish a durable legal framework 
consistent with American values in support of counterterrorism operations, there 
is clearly more work to be done. The Usama Bin Laden raid in Abbottobad, 
Pakistan in May 2011 was conducted with a blend of U.S. Title 50 and Title 10 
authorities in a manner that was technically not required. As Joseph Berger 
points out, the raid was conducted by U.S. military forces under the authority and 
control of the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.167  In reality, the CIA 
director had no real control over the operation and the Department of Defense 
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essentially ‘borrowed’ CIA’s title 50 authority to conduct covert action. Berger 
points out that the President has the authority to appoint any Department or 
Agency to conduct covert action if he deems it necessary. Additionally, the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense has inherent authority under Title 50 of U.S. Code to 
conduct traditional military activities. A raid into Pakistan by U.S. Special 
Operations Forces was arguably a traditional military activity.168  The legal 
construct for the UBL raid may still raise some questions for lawyers and critics, 
but the administration used current law to establish a legal framework for the 
operation. Most importantly, the operation itself accomplished a clear and long 
stated policy goal that was consistent with American values.  
4. Execute the Mission(s)  
Specific mission planning is the domain of the tactical experts. Leaders 
should ensure that agencies and departments are tasked within the scope of 
their areas of expertise and supported when necessary. This thesis is not 
intended to evaluate the tactical efforts of the Mossad or the Israeli Defense 
Forces. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Spring of Youth mission 
combined intelligence and military assets according to their areas of expertise 
and achieved decisive tactical success. Spring of Youth was similar to the joint-
interagency counterterrorism operations that have been conducted successfully 
by U.S. forces since 2001 and culminated with the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 
Pakistan in 2011, after ten years of exhaustive intelligence collection, analysis 
and planning.  
5. Assess the Effects  
Assessment of tactical actions and the strategy they support are two 
different things. While a tactical action can be evaluated based on whether a 
target was killed or captured and how many friendly forces or innocents were 
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killed in the process, the effectiveness of the strategy is not always easily 
measured by simple metrics. Israel achieved tactical success during most of the 
Wrath of God missions. But the strategy failed to deter PLO attacks and other 
than Spring of Youth, prevented very few planned attacks from occurring. Israel 
never established a measure of effectiveness to determine if its one-dimensional 
kill strategy was working with respect to achieving their goals. In developing a 
strategy, leaders must identify how they will measure whether it is being 
effective. Certainly the increase in violence by the PLO after each Wrath of God 
attack was a possible indicator that the strategy was not working.  
6. Adjust the Plan or Strategy 
Tactical plans must be altered as the situation changes. A tactical plan is 
not a script in play and the best plans are built to be flexible and account for 
contingencies. Similarly, a good strategy must allow for adaptation to changes in 
the environment. The desired endstate is what the strategy aims to achieve. The 
goals that are used to define the strategy and the milestones used as benchmark 
achievements to measure the performance of a strategy must be incrementally 
reviewed to determine if the strategy is working. All strategies and subsequent 
plans are built on incomplete and sometimes imperfect information. Military 
strategists would attribute this to the “fog of war” which is essentially everything 
we do not know about the environment and the enemy. As the strategy is 
implemented and milestones are reached, the effects of the various supporting 
actions should be critically reviewed. Planners must constantly seek to increase 
their information about the environment and the actors in it during the 
implementation of the strategy in order to reduce the fog of war and amend the 
strategy for maximum effectiveness. During operation Eichmann, the decision 
was made to plan a strategy without the input of the Israeli Ambassador to 
Argentina. The information that the strategy was built on was purposely curtailed 
and as a result the Israeli post-operations plan designed to mitigate political 
tensions with Argentina was ineffective. After the Argentine government 
denounced Israel’s ‘private citizen team’ cover story, Israel never amended their 
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plan to mitigate the political tensions. During Wrath of God, Israeli leaders never 
assessed whether their strategy was working toward achieving any of PM Meir’s 
expressed goals. The frequency of violent attacks against Israeli citizens 
increased after Wrath of God was implemented. Additionally, PLO attacks 
become more audacious and focused against Israeli security and diplomatic 
officials, culminating with three explosive devices emplaced in New York City in 
March 1973 intended to kill PM Meir herself. In spite of the PLO’s violent 
responses to Wrath of God, the plan continued until July 1973 when the entire 
operation was exposed in Lillehammer. 
The chart in Figure 4 is a flow diagram that can be used as a simple 
strategic planning template. Clandestine and covert plans should only be 
executed as part of a larger strategy. The flow chart provides a step-by-step 
guide that incorporates the three strategic phases:  Visualize, Design, and 
Evaluate. In the visualization phase, the problem facing the nation is defined, the 
leaders then elaborate a clear endstate, and specific goals are developed that 
characterize the endstate. In the design phase, a strategy is developed using 
appropriate ways and means within the DIME construct. From the overarching 
strategy, specific plans are developed to achieve incremental milestones that will 
lead to the strategic goals. In the evaluation phase, the plans are executed and 
data is gathered that regarding the measures of performance established during 
planning and the corresponding measures of effectiveness. The effects are then 
compared to the goals established in the endstate to determine if the strategy is 
working. The strategy or specific plans are revised as required to better support 
the endstate. This process continues until the endstate is achieved.  
In the chart, HVI operations are linked to specific goals. Those goals are 
derived from and characterize an overall desired endstate. HVI missions reflect 
specific tactical plans created during directed planning in support of a national 




Figure 4.  Strategic Planning Flow Chart 
 
The lesson from Israel is that covert and clandestine HVI operations 
should be nested in a larger strategy that incorporates all relevant elements of 
national power aimed at achieving a desired endstate through a comprehensive, 
consistent and sound strategy. When viewed as part of a larger strategy, the 
results of any actions should be evaluated both tactically and also strategically. 
Leaders must assess how well the tactical plans support the strategy and also 
whether the strategy itself is moving the environmental conditions closer to the 
desired endstate. The endstate can be viewed at the right end of a timeline, with 
current conditions on the left. The strategy is the nation’s plan to arrive at the 
desired endstate. The national goals should reflect logical milestones along that 
path. Covert and clandestine actions may, at times, be implemented as specific 
plans aimed at achieving selected goals. National leaders require evaluative 
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tools to measure performance of the strategy and also its effectiveness. 
Supporting plans may need to be incrementally altered or curtailed as their 
effectiveness is reviewed. Similarly the strategy as a whole should be reviewed, 
particularly if supporting plans are tactically successful but strategic goals are still 
not being met. 
The Israeli leaders have often decided to use their considerable 
clandestine and covert mechanisms in order to achieve national goals. At times, 
covert means were used properly in support of a clear endstate, realistic goals 
and sound strategy. Similarly, the same means were misapplied in other 
situations and the leaders were held accountable to their constituents and the 
support of their respective parties in much the same manner as the U.S. leaders 
are today. During Operation Eichmann, PM Ben-Gurion envisioned a clear 
endstate of public justice for crimes against the Jewish people during the 
holocaust. That endstate was supported by one simple goal; arresting Adolf 
Eichmann in order for him to stand trial in Israel. The strategy, while it failed to 
fully consider and mitigate the Argentinian response and diplomatic crisis, was 
sound with regard to plan to capture Eichmann. The goals and the means to 
accomplish them were consistent with Israeli values and approached in a rational 
and critical manner. PM Meir failed to apply rational prudence in reacting to the 
Munich massacre and the perceived terror crisis that was embodied in BSO. She 
reacted emotionally to the popular media and established goals of symbolic 
violence that were not tied to a clear endstate.  
Was the goal of Wrath of God deterrence of PLO sanctioned terror?  
Prevention of planned attacks by specific groups?  Or simply retroactive street 
justice that the Israel populace had become accustomed to over decades of 
conflict with the Palestinian Arabs?  The strategy required to accomplish one of 
these goals may not have supported the other. PM Meir needed to define the real 
problem(s) that Israel was facing; social unrest due to emotional outrage and a 
demand for justice, or the continued loss of Israeli lives due to growing capability, 
resolve and globally networked PLO terrorism?  Once the problem was defined, 
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PM Meir could have envisioned the endstate she desired for the Israeli people. 
The subsequent tactical plan embodied in Wrath of God would have been one 
part of a ‘carrot and stick’ approach that offered a political and economic solution 
to the Palestinian people while at the same time held PLO leaders accountable 
for militant attacks.  
Inevitably, the covert and clandestine activities of a nation become a 
matter of accountability, especially those actions aimed at killing or capturing 
HVI’s. National leaders who approve, plan and endorse such operations are 
accountable, in a democracy, to the people and the laws that govern them. While 
there is a measure of accountability to other nation-states affected by the actions, 
those concerns are largely a practical matter of risk calculation based on the 
durability of existing international relationships. The most pervasive risk is the 
domestic political one. Policy makers should not shy away from using all of the 
implements of national power to accomplish those goals worthy of the title 
‘national priority’.  
On the contrary, national leaders should seek to act boldly when the 
people’s security or the nation’s interests are at risk. Bold action must also be 
guided by sound reason, a well-articulated strategy and strict adherence to the 
nation’s values. The value of the goal [or target], does not warrant deviating from 
the nation’s values. Justice cannot be served by unjust acts and terror is not 
thwarted through acts of nationally sponsored terrorism. Killing or capturing the 
nation’s enemies, even via covert or clandestine means, can be both ethical and 
effective provided those actions are tied clearly established national goals as part 
of a well-articulated strategy that has undergone thorough analysis. The people 
have placed their trust in their elected officials and military leaders, expecting 
them to act responsibly and conscientiously on the nation’s behalf. With that in 
mind, those same leaders should act bravely and boldly to defend our nation and 
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APPENDIX A.  ISRAELI NAZI HUNTING EFFORTS 
The reality is that Israel had put little effort, if any, into Nazi hunting after 
gaining independence from Britain in 1948. The young nation was just too busy 
trying to establish itself, build internal institutions and ward off real threats from its 
Arab neighbors.169  From 1948 to 1956, Israel was in a near constant state of 
violent conflict with its Arab neighbors and dissidents inside the Palestinian 
enclaves in the region. Israel’s intelligence services were therefore consumed 
with penetrating and neutralizing the Arab threat, along with maintaining a vigilant 
watch on the growing internal threat posed by the Israeli communist 
movement.170  The government was also overwhelmed with waves of Jewish 
immigrants arriving daily from all over Europe. Within a few years of 
independence from Britain, Israel’s population had doubled.171   
Although hunting Nazi war criminals was not a state priority, much of the 
Israeli population was comprised of people directly affected by the war. The 
collective business of building and securing the new nation and the individual 
focus on rebuilding families was simply an all-encompassing task. Only after Fritz 
Bauer, a Jewish prosecutor in West Germany, received a tip from a friend in 
Argentina in 1957, did the whereabouts of Adolf Eichmann become a state issue 
for Israel. Fritz’s friend Lothar Hermann, a retired half-Jew living in Argentina, 
believed that his daughter had made the acquaintance of Adolf Eichmann’s son. 
Lothar wrote to his friend Fritz and Fritz in turn approached the Israeli 
government, believing that Germany was not interested in hunting Nazi’s and 
only Israel had a true stake in bringing people like Eichmann to justice.172  The 
information on Eichmann was passed to Walter Eytan, Director-General of the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affaris, who in turn called Isser Harel, chief of the Mossad.173  
Harel knew full well that the people of Israel had not forgotten the atrocities 
suffered in the concentration camps and thanks to enterprising independent Nazi 
hunters like Simon Wiesenthal, the Israeli government had substantial historic 
files relating to key Nazi’s like Eichmann. Zvi Aharoni, the chief of Mossad’s 
interrogation unit wrote, “Files relating to Adolf Eichmann, Martin Bormann or 
Heinrich Mueller (of the Gestapo) lay about for all to see in one of the offices.”174   
In addition to the historic files, Eichmann’s name had been reintroduced in 
the public sphere in Israel during the famed 9 month Kastner trials.175  Kastner, a 
Hungarian Jew and leader of the local Zionist relief organization in Budapest, 
attempted to negotiate with Eichmann during the Nazi occupation of Hungary to 
secure the release and deportation of several thousand Jews from Hungary 
instead of shipping them to concentration camps. Since Eichmann allowed only a 
fraction of 750,000 Jews in Hungary to leave, most of them being wealthy, 
Kastner received a great deal of criticism after the war for “collaborating” with the 
Nazis. Eichmann personally oversaw the implementation of the “final solution” in 
Hungary and as a result, over 450,000 Hungarian Jews died in concentration 
camps. Kastner was later publicly vindicated in 1958 by Israeli Attorney General 
Haim Cohen for doing what he could to save Jews during the war. Unfortunately, 
Kastner was assassinated on his doorstep in Tel Aviv in March 1957.176  The 
result of the Kastner trial media fanfare propelled Eichmann, although generally 
believed to be dead, back into the domestic public arena as a key figure in the 
implementation of the “final solution.”   
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A. OPERATION EICHMANN TIMELINE 
June 1950, Adolf Eichmann arrives in Geneo, Italy and acquires new 
identity papers from the Red Cross, with the help of the Catholic Church, and 
adopts the alias ‘Ricardo Klement’. Later that month he acquires an Argentine 
visa. 
14 July 1950, Ricardo Klement arrives via passenger ship in Beunos 
Aires. Viera Eichmann and her two sons leave Austria and arrive Buenos Aires in 
1952. Soon thereafter, Viera remarries to ‘Ricardo Klement’. 
September 1957, Fritz Bauer (German prosecutor in Hessen) meets with 
the senior Israeli representative to West Germany, Eliezer Shinar, to share his 
suspicious that Adolf Eichmann is living in Buenos Aires. Fritz does not reveal his 
source, but gives an address: 4261 Chacabuco Street, Olivos, Buenos Aires. 
Bauer reports that Eichmann’s eldest son is using his real last name. No other 
identifying information is known. 
January 1958, Isser Harel dispatches an experienced Mossad agent to 
investigate the report. House is owned by an expatriate German and is used as 
income rental property. Little else is found and no connection to the Eichmann 
name. Harel dispatches an agent to Frankfurt to meet with Bauer and relay the 
negative report. Bauer then agrees to give up the source in Buenos Aires:  Lothar 
Hermann, a Jewish concentration camp survivor who is now blind. 
March 1958, top Israeli police investigator, Ephraim Hofstaetter, is 
enroute to Argentina for an INTERPOL conference. Harel asks him to meet with 
the source. Hofstaetter brings a signed letter from Bauer as bona fides for the 
meeting. Hofstaetter uses cover as ‘representative of German authorities’ during 
his meeting. Hermann’s daughter had met a young man named Nicolas 
Eichmann. Nicolas claimed his father was a Nazi during the war. Nicolas was 
strongly anti-semitic. Hermann agreed to follow up on the Eichmann report and 
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try to find more information, but seems overly concerned about financial 
compensation. 
May 1958, Hermann reports that the house at 4261 Chacabuco Street is 
owned by an Austrian named Francisco Schmidt. Schmidt has rented the house 
as two apartments. The apartment electricity meters are registered to tenants 
named ‘Dagoto’ and ‘Clement’. Hermann is convinced that Schmidt is 
Eichmann’s alias. Harel’s agents check on Schmidt, who does own the house, 
but does not live there. Hermann continues to claim that Schmidt is Eichmann 
and further damages his credibility with the Mossad. Harel orders his team to 
gradually sever contact with Hermann. 
June 1958 – December 1959, Harel determines that in light of the recent 
interest in Eichmann, and the fact that Israel had a lot of uncorrobated raw 
information on former Nazi’s, a special unit should be created to investigate the 
available data. Several reports surface about Eichmann being in ‘Bad Aussee’ or 
‘Alt Aussee’ in 1955 and 1959. Another report from the head of the Bureau for 
Investigation on Nazi War Crimes in Germany surfaced in October 1959 and 
claimed Eichmann was in Kuwait working for an oil company.177 
December 1959, Dr. Bauer arrives in Israel with new information about 
Eichmann from his own private investigation. Bauer discovers that Eichmann was 
given a Red Cross passport in Italy under the name ‘Ricardo Klement’. 
Additionally, Eichmann had been in hiding in a monastery in Croatia after the war 
and briefly visited his wife in Austria in 1950 before traveling to Italy and then 
Argentina. There was a Klement listing in the Buenos Aires phone book 
beginning in 1952. Klement also ran a laundry shop in the Olivos district in 
Buenos Aires; the same district as the address on Chacabuco street. 
January 1960, Harel dispatches Zvi Aharoni, a senior agent, to Buenos 
Aires to find Ricardo Klement. Zvi tracks the Klements to San Fernando district. 
Believes that a family fitting the Eichmann profile may be in the area. 
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February 1960, additional agents sent to conduct surveillance and 
establish cover. Posing as real-estate investors, agents find a house believed to 
be that of Ricardo Klement and his family in San Fernando district of Buenos 
Aires. Agents acquire clandestine photographs of a man who fits Eichmann’s 
description.  
21 March 1960, Ricardo Klement is observed buying flowers at a shop 
near his house in San Fernando. This behavior is very atypical for the low 
income Mr. Klement. Agents observe Klement hand flowers to his wife at the 
door of their house and kiss her. 21 March is Viera and Adolf Eichmann’s 
wedding anniversary. After independent analysis of the previous photos, Harel is 
convinced they have found Adolf Eichmann. 
11 MAY 1960, Adolf Eichmann steps off the bus and begins the short walk 
down the dirt road to his home on Garibaldi Street. A few moments later, he is 
captured by five Israeli MOSSAD agents and brought to a safehouse in Buenos 
Aires. There, he is given a medical examination. The scars and on his body and 
his SS-blood type tattoo match the German military medical file on Adolf 
Eichmann. During his first interrogation, he states “Ich bin Adolf Eichmann”  (I am 
Adolf Eichmann).  
20 MAY 1960, an El Al airliner lands in Buenos Aires carrying an Israeli 
delegation to Argentina’s 150th Anniversary Celebration. 
21 MAY 1960, the Mossad team, posing as El Al aircrew, board the plane 
with Eichmann in a wheel chair and drugged. Eichmann is reportedly an ex-
patriot Jew who is in poor health and wishes to return to Israel before he dies. 
The plan takes off for Israel that evening without incident. 
23 May 1960, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion makes his announcement to the 
Knesset that Eichmann is in custody and will stand trial. 
6 June 1960, Israel offers the story to Argentina that private Israel citizens 
tracked down Eichmann and approached him. Eichmann volunteered to travel to 
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Israel to stand trial. The story is immediately dismissed by Argentine foreign 
minister. 
21 June 1960, Argentine representative to the United Nations and former 
collaborator with Himmler’s secret police, Mario Amadeo, makes formal 
complaint to UN Security council.178 
July 1960, President Frondizi declares the Israeli Ambassador “persona 
non-grata” in an effort to appease Nationalist elements in his own government. 
August 1960, U.S. diplomats in Buenos Aires meet with their Argentine 
counterparts and relay the message to the Israelis that the crisis is over and 
diplomatic relations can resume. 
April 1961, Adolf Eichmann trial begins in Israel 
December 1961, Guilty verdict issued. 
31 May 1961, Eichmann execution. Eichmann is hung at Ramleh prison 
1 Jun2 1962, The Jewish daughter (Graciela Sirota) of the owner of the 
safehouse used by Mossad to hide Eichmann in Buenos Aires is kidnapped, 
tortured and released with a swastika burned into her breast. A second Jewish 
girl in Buenos Aires, Mirta Penjerek, was accused of supplying the Mossad with 
food and therefore murdered. The perpetrators of both attacks were never 
identified.179 
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APPENDIX B.  ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
The first phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be viewed as a period of 
polarization between the Jewish population and the Palestinian Arabs during the 
British mandate from 1918 to 1948. During this period both the Jews and the 
Palestinians formed their own state institutions, including military and intelligence 
branches that mirrored those of the ruling British government. These institutions 
were essentially formed to combat each other, while avoiding direct British 
interference. The Israelis established the ‘Haganah’ as their military branch under 
the Yishuv ruling council. The Haganah’s intelligence arm was called “Shai” and 
would be the precursor for the modern Shin Bet (domestic security), Mossad 
(foreign intelligence) and Aman (military intelligence). The Arabs declared Haji 
Amin al-Husseini to be their Grand Mufti (religious leader) in 1921. Haji Amin 
immediately went about the task of secretly organizing the prominent Arab 
families and intellectuals under one cohesive guiding command known as the 
“Supreme Arab Committee” (SAC).  
The SAC’s primary mission was planning and controlling a regional Arab 
revolt against British control and Jewish settlements in 1936. The revolt lasted 
until 1939 and was finally defeated by British forces with help from the Haganah. 
The Shai underwent major reforms as a result of the Arab revolt in an attempt to 
better predict and disrupt future organized Arab actions. In 1947, the day after 
the United Nations announced support for partition of Palestine between Jewish 
and Arab factions, the SAC directed another wave of terror attacks that killed 
hundreds of Jews.180  The conflict between Jews and Arabs in the region was 
now fully realized as a polarized two party fight over territory and control.  
After Israeli independence in 1948, the conflict between Palestinian Arabs 
and Jews intensified and became a conflict between states as Egypt , Jordan 
and Syria began supplying arms, intelligence, sanctuary, training and even 
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operational guidance to Palestinian insurgents. The Palestinians also became 
more organized and sophisticated in their tactics. The Palestinians were given an 
opportunity to participate in Israeli politics. , Party nominations were approved by 
the Shin Bet, however, and closely monitored. Any Palestinian that wanted to 
express more radical or anti-Jewish views was marginalized. The end result of 
the political marginalization was to create a large pool of recruits for militant 
activity against Israel. Egypt exploited this pool of recruits, sending Colonel 
Mustafa Hafez to organize and lead an insurgent campaign against Israel 
between 1952 and 1956.  
While insurgent violence against Israel had been a consistent problem 
since 1948, the violence increased 600% under Colonel Hafez with nearly 70 
attacks against Israeli facilities and personnel occurring in 1956. Israel’s 
response to the insurgent attacks, besides increased border and facilities 
security, was to form an elite raid force called Unit 101. Unit 101, led by Ahud 
Sharon, targeted Palestinian leaders. Although Unit 101 was intended to deter 
Arab attacks, the number of Arab attacks rose steadily between Unit 101’s 
inception in 1953 and its disbandment in 1956. The wave of Arab guerilla attacks 
subsided after the newly formed Mossad conducted an agent operation that 
finally killed Colonel Hafez with a package bomb in 1956. The events of 1956 
were quickly overshadowed as Egyptian forces occupied the portions of the Sinai 
Peninsula around the Suez Canal and blocked passage of Israeli ships. During 
the evolution of the regional conflict, the Palestinians reorganized their militant 
arm Fatah.  
Fatah was established under Yasir Arafat in 1956 and later subsumed into 
the PLO. While Fatah was initially a guerilla organization with strong ties to 
Egypt, the PLO also had a uniformed military arm called the Palestine Liberation 
Army (PLA).181  After the 1967 war, Dr. George Habash formed the leftist group 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which initially competed 
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with the PLO and Fatah for both political and military leadership of the 
Palestinian cause.182  By the end of the 1960s, Yassir Arafat had moved up from 
leadership of Fatah to assume control over the entire PLO. Yassir Arafat had 
already achieved considerable fame in Palestinian circles as an Arab freedom 
fighter and brought a more militant and dynamic approach to the PLO cause. 
Additionally, the Fatah and PFLP had been competitors in the campaign to 
champion the leadership of the Palestinian diaspora; however, they began 
cooperating more on militant actions against Israel by the early 1970s.  
In 1967, the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria were decimated 
by Israel during the 6 days war. Israel expanded its extra-territorial holdings in 
the Golan, West Bank and Gaza. By the end of the conflict over 100,000 
additional displaced persons, mostly Palestinians, had fled to refugee camps in 
Lebanon and Jordan.183  This event marked a transition for the Palestinian 
resistance and the beginning of a new phase of escalating violence and adaptive 
tactics and organizational strategies on both sides of the conflict. The large 
refugee population created a new pool of disgruntled Palestinians to recruit from, 
swelling the ranks of Fatah.  
During the period from 1967 through the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, The 
Palestinians began to organize into a more centralized proto-government with 
political, military and intelligence institutions that were both distinct from their 
Arab state sponsors in Egypt, Syria and Jordan and also more sophisticated. The 
defeat of the Arab states in 1967 also forced the Palestinians nationalists to 
move into exile, often into Europe, while recognizing the inherent limitations of 
any support from their Arab sponsors.184  The result of the demonstrated 
impotence of the Arab states against Israel both served to foment a greater 
sense of independent Palestinian identity and freedom of action without the need 
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for any state sponsorship. The PLO, as the larger umbrella organization 
responsible for Palestinian nationalism, suffered a crisis of legitimacy as over 
300,000 more Palestinians were in refugee status after the war and PLO 
economic and social control over its constituents was threatened.185  The PLO 
response to the post-1967 existential crisis was to increase the scale and 
lethality of its guerilla campaign against Israel.  
By February 1968, Fatah had lost over 200 fighters to Israeli forces during 
their attempts to re-establish the primacy of the violent struggle against Israel. 
Needing sanctuary outside of the Israeli occupied territories in order to 
consolidate and prepare for operations, Fatah began to collect its forces near the 
border town of Karamah in Jordan. Sympathetic to the Palestinian struggle, most 
Jordanian forces either ignored the infiltrators or provided support and even 
cover fire during missions to infiltrate Israel by crossing the Jordan River.186  By 
early 1968 over 1,000 Fatah and PFLP fighters were encamped near Karamah in 
the shadow of a Jordanian division. In March 1968 the Palestinians had 
conducted over 30 cross border attacks into Israel from Karamah and although 
King Husayn feared Israeli reprisal he moved cautiously in discouraging guerilla 
strikes for fear of public backlash from his over 60% Palestinian population. On 
21 March, Israel finally struck in force, assaulting Karamah with armor, artillery 
and airpower and systematically destroying the guerilla camps while at the same 
time engaging and inflicting severe casualties on Jordanian forces. Even though 
Israeli suffered the fewest casualties of the three parties, they still had 28 dead 
and 90 wounded with at least one aircraft and several tanks and other vehicles 
destroyed. The PLO rapidly exploited the Israeli losses in local media and reaped 
the rewards in terms of increased legitimacy and a surge in volunteers to join the 
armed struggle. By late 1969, the combined forces of Fatah and PFLP had 
increased from several hundred to several thousand.187   
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By 1970, King Husayn had grown increasingly concerned about the long 
term consequences of harboring the now sizeable Palestinian guerilla forces in 
his country. After an incident at Dawson airfield in Jordan in early September, 
1970, where PFLP members hijacked four airliners and forced them to land and, 
after failed negotiations for the release of Palestinian prisoners, destroyed the 
now empty aircraft in front of the international media. King Husayn feared that 
Jordan was now center stage for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the tenuous 
control of his Hashemite regime might be threatened. He decided to take 
decisive action against the PLO guerillas in Jordan on 17 September 1970 and 
by the end of the month, his forces had killed or captured hundreds of PLO 
guerillas and forced many more to flee. The PLO called it “Black September” and 
swore to avenge their comrades and punish Jordan.  
Black September marked a turning point for the PLO. Yasir Arafat looked 
for ways to adapt to the defeat in Jordan and even exploit the loss and ordered 
the creation of the infamous “Black September Organization” which the PLO 
would publicly deny association with. BSO would actually work under the Fatah 
hierarchy and be controlled by Arafat’s trusted acolyte Ali Hasan Salameh aka 
“The Red Prince.”  Salameh was the operational link between the BSO and the 
rest of Fatah. Fatah cofounder Salah Khalef aka Abu Iyad was placed directly in 
charge of BSO and reported to Salameh.188  Later BSO would evolve into less of 
a cohesive group and more of an operational cover used by various elements of 
the PLO during the conduct of terror attacks. Ever adaptive, the PLO reacted to 
the Black September events by branching out to other sympathetic extremist 
groups such as the Japanese Red Brigade, the Irish Republican Army, and the 
Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, the Basque separatists ETA, the Red 
Brigades in Italy and Action Directe in France.189  By 1972, several non-Arab 
extremist groups had set up shop in Beirut and regularly participated in training 
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with their PLO brethren.190Making good on the threats against Jordan, BSO 
killed Jordanian Prime minister Wasfi Tal on November 28, 1971.191  The PLO 
then expanded its reach internationally and began to attack Israeli and other 
Western targets on an unprecedented scale.  
By 1972, the PLO and other groups had come to fully appreciate the 
power of mass media, especially television, to broadcast their political message, 
influence populations both domestically and abroad, and most importantly the 
ability to influence policymakers. Ami Pedhazur noted: 
The Palestinian organization understood the great effect of a well-
designed attack and how it was able to attract a mass audience all 
over the world while not necessarily requiring a high number of 
victims. Via this medium, they could distribute their political agenda 
quite effectively. Their attacks made us of what scholars termed the 
tools of a “theater of terror.”  While the strategic impact of such 
attacks was minor, its influence on the public and policymakers was 
immense.192 
The ‘theater of terror’ was played largely through a series of airline 
hijackings, mostly by PFLP members, from the late 1960s to 1972, but as the 
PLO once again sought to direct attacks against Israel other means of 
spectacular attacks would be required for the stage. On May 8, 1972 four BSO 
members hijacked a Sabena Airlines jet enroute from Vienna to Tel Aviv. The 
four hijackers forced the plane to land at Lod airport in Israel and demanded the 
release of hundreds of PLO members held in Israeli prisons. Israel responded by 
negotiating with the terrorists until the Sayaret Matkal Unit could move into 
position. In a stunning display of counterterror tactics, the Sayaret stormed the 
plane on May 9th, killing two of the BSO team and capturing the other two. One 
passenger was killed but the operation was touted as a great Israeli success.193   
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A few weeks later, the PLO responded to the May 9th counterterror action, 
while at the same time demonstrating their new international network of 
relationships. On May 30th, 1972 three members of the Japanese Red Army 
Faction, at the direction of the PLO and with PLFP logistical support, walked in 
the passport control terminal at Lod airport and began shooting randomly into the 
crowd of travelers with Kalashnikov rifles and hand grenades. After a brief gun 
battle with police, the incident ended with 26 civilian deaths and many more 
wounded. The spectacular attack at Lod forced the Israeli’s to greatly improve 
security at airports and international El Al counters.194   The period of escalating 
violence and adaptive tactics between Israel and the PLO was in full swing by the 
summer of 1972.  
In July, Israeli agents killed the PLFP spokesman Ghassan Kanafani, who 
had sent photographs of himself with the three Japanese Red Army members 
from the Lod Airport attack to the Beirut newspapers. The Israeli public was 
outraged by the Beirut news and the Israeli response was a bomb attached to 
Kanafani’s car and wired to the ignition. The blast killed Kanafani and his 17-year 
old niece.195  The PLO responded by sending an 8 man team of Fedayeen to 
Libya to train for a special operation. On 5 September, the 8 man team 
conducted one of the most bold and publicly televised hostage operations the 
world had seen in Munich. After the massacre of the 11 Israeli Olympic team 
members at Munich, vengeance against those deemed responsible was 
established as a critical national goal.  
Although most of the PLO members targeted during Operation Wrath of 
God were killed in the months immediately following Munich, the most significant 
targets such as Ali Hassan Salameh and Atef Bseiso were not killed until 1979 
and 1992 respectively. Abu Daoud, another key operational leader and 
acclaimed “mastermind” of the Munich attack, died in 2010 at age 73 of kidney 
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failure.196  The strategic impact of Wrath of God was culminated with the 
combined Egyptian and Syrian surprise attack against Israel on October 6th, 
1973. While Israel suffered the greatest negative impacts from their obsession 
with the tactic of assassination during the Yom Kippur War, the institutional 
memories of the European nations affected  by Wrath of God would endure long 
past 1973. After the Bseiso assassination in Paris in 1992, the French suspected 
Mossad, but could not find any evidence. The French security service chief 
asked for a meeting with his Mossad counterpart and stated, “We know you killed 
Bseiso. We’re still working on the proof. When it comes through, you’ll get what’s 
coming to you. In no way am I willing to allow you to turn Paris into your stage for 
acts of war and assassinations. We’re not going back to the early seventies, 
when you did whatever the hell you wanted here.”197   
  
                                            
196 Richard Spencer, “Black September Terrorist Who Masterminded the Munich Massacre, 
Dead in Syria,” The Telegraph, 4 September 2010. accessed 24 May, 2013 at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/7871344/Black-September-
terrorist-who-masterminded-the-Munich-massacre-dead-in-Syria.html 
197 Klein, Striking Back, 8.  
 115
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abrahms, Max. “What Terrorist Really Want: Terrorist Motives and 
Counterterrorism Strategy.” International Security, 32, no.4 (Spring 2008): 
78–105.  
“After Munich: Israel Debates the Response.” Journal of Palestine Studies, 2, 
no.2 (Winter, 1973): 142–149. accessed 4 March 2013 at:  
www.jstor.org/stable/2535488 
Ashman, Charles, and Robert J. Wagma. The Nazi Hunters. New York: Pharos 
Books, 1988. 
Bascomb, Neil. Hunting Eichmann: How a Band of Survivors and a Young Spy 
Agency Chased Down the World’s Most Notorious Nazi. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009. 
Black, Ian, and Benny Morris. Israel’s Secret Wars:  A History of Israel’s 
Intelligence Services. New York:  Grove Press, 1991. 
Calahan, Alexander B. “Countering Terrorism:  The Israeli Response to the 1973 
Munich Olympic massacre and the Development of Independent Covert 
Action Teams.”  master’s thesis,  Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College, 1995. 
Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and 
Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.  
Crenshaw, Martha. “Theories of Terrorism:  Instrumental and Organization 
Approaches” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.  
Fearon, James D. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of 
International Disputes,”American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 577–
592. 
Goni, Uki. The Real Odessa: How Peron Brought the Nazi War Criminals to 
Argentina. London: Granta Books, 2001. 
Hajjar, Lisa. “International Humanitarian Law and Wars on Terror:  A 
Comparative Analysis of Israeli and American Doctrines and Policies.” 
Journal of Palestine Studies, 36, no.1 (Autumn 2006): 21–42. 
Harel, Isser. The House on Garibaldi Street. New York: Viking Press, 1975. 
 116
Jefferson, Thomas. “A Letter to John B. Colvin.” (20 September, 1810). accessed 
on 21 May, 2013 at:  
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-john-b-colvin/. 
Jonas, George. Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Counterterrorist Team. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005.  
Jordan, Jenna. “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership 
Decapitation.” Security Studies, 18 (2009): 719–755. 
Katz, Samuel. Guards Without Borders: Israel’s War Against Terrorism. London:  
Arms and Armour, 1990. 
Katsineris, Steven. “Forgotten History: The Case Of Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 
114.” Media Monitors, 8 February, 2008. Accessed 3 May, 2013: 
http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/49348. 
Klein, Aaron J. Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s 
Deadly Response. New York: Random House, 2005. 
Kurz, Anat N. Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a 
Popular Struggle. Portland, Oregon: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. 
Malkin, Peter Z., and Harry Stein. Eichmann in My Hands. New York: Warner 
Books, 1990. 
Martínez, Tomás Eloy, and Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars.Latin American Program. Peron and the Nazi War Criminals 
(Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1984). 
National Archives, President Barack Obama Speech, May 21, 2009 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–0: Joint Operations, 
(Washington, DC: Pentagon, 11 August 2011). 
Orend, Brian. “War.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008). 
accessed on 5 May, 2013 at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/. 
Ostrowski, Victor. www.victorostrowski.com:  accessed 3 May 2013 at:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8nMAidvODnE 
Pedahzur, Ami. The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.  
 117
Perry, David L. “Repugnant Philosopy: Ethics, Espionage, and Covert Action.” 
Journal of Conflict Studies (Spring 1995). accessed on 15 May, 2013 at:  
http://home.earthlink.net/~davidlperry/covert.htm.  
“PFLP English Language website,” accessed 23 April 2013 at:  
http://pflp.ps/english/category/documents/ 
Rayfield, Gordon. The Righteous Executioners: A Comparative Analysis of 
Jewish Terrorists of the 1940’s and Palestinian Terrorists of the 1970’s. 
New York:  City University of New York, 1980. 
Regan, Geoffrey. Israel and the Arabs. Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge 
Press, 1984. 
Reeve, Simon. One Day in September. New York:  Arcade Publishing, 2011. 
Kindle Edition. 
Rein, Ranaan. Argentina, Israel, and the Jews: Peron, the Eichmann Capture 
and After (Bethesda, MD: University of Maryland Press, 2002). 
Reveron, Derek S. and James L. Cook. “Developing Strategists:  Translating 
National Strategy into Theater Strategy.” Joint Forces Quarterly, 55 (4th 
Quarter 2009): 21–28. accessed at:  
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-55/4.pdf 
Rubenberg, Cheryl. The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institutional 
Infrastructure (Belmont, Massechusetts: Institute for Arab Studies, 1983). 
Safire, William. “Covert Operation or Clandestine?” New York Times, 14 
February, 2005. 
Sayigh, Yezid. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian 
National Movement, 1949–1993. London: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Spencer, Richard. “Black September Terrorist Who Masterminded the Munich 
Massacre, Dead in Syria.” The Telegraph, 4 September 2010. accessed 




Treverton, Gregory F. “The Ethics of Covert Intervention.” International Journal, 
43, no.2 (Spring 1988): 302–319. Accessed on 3 April, 2013 at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40202529?origin=JSTOR-pdf. 
United States Army. Field Manual 5–0: Army Planning and Orders Production. 
Washington, DC, January 2005. 
 118
White House. National Security Strategy. Washington, DC: White House, 2010. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_
strategy.pdf. 




Yoblonka, Hanna, and Ora Cummings. State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann. 
Westminster, MD: Knopf Publishing, 2004. 
 
 119
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
